CMP-SPRCM-75-34

SELECTIONS FROM PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAGAZINES

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
HONG KONG, B.C.C.

NOVEMBER 24, 1975

U.S

U. I. C. C.
JAN 19 1976
LIBRARY

DISTRIBUTED BY:

NTIS
National Technical Information Service
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

KEEP UP TO DATE

Between the time you ordered this report—which is only one of the hundreds of thousands in the NTIS information collection available to you—and the time you are reading this message, several *new* reports relevant to your interests probably have entered the collection.

Subscribe to the **Weekly Government Abstracts** series that will bring you summaries of new reports *as soon as they are received by NTIS* from the originators of the research. The WGA's are an NTIS weekly newsletter service covering the most recent research findings in 25 areas of industrial, technological, and sociological interest—invaluable information for executives and professionals who must keep up to date.

The executive and professional information service provided by NTIS in the **Weekly Government Abstracts** newsletters will give you thorough and comprehensive coverage of government-conducted or sponsored research activities. And you'll get this important information within two weeks of the time it's released by originating agencies.

WGA newsletters are computer produced and electronically photocomposed to slash the time gap between the release of a report and its availability. You can learn about technical innovations immediately—and use them in the most meaningful and productive ways possible for your organization. Please request NTIS-PR-205/PCW for more information.

The weekly newsletter series will keep you current. But *learn what you have missed in the past* by ordering a computer **NTISearch** of all the research reports in your area of interest, dating as far back as 1964, if you wish. Please request NTIS-PR-186/PCN for more information.

WRITE: Managing Editor
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161

Keep Up To Date With SRIM

SRIM (Selected Research in Microfiche) provides you with regular, automatic distribution of the complete texts of NTIS research reports *only* in the subject areas you select. SRIM covers almost all Government research reports by subject area and/or the originating Federal or local government agency. You may subscribe by any category or subcategory of our WGA **(Weekly Government Abstracts)** or **Government Reports Announcements and Index** categories, or to the reports issued by a particular agency such as the Department of Defense, Federal Energy Administration, or Environmental Protection Agency. Other options that will give you greater selectivity are available on request.

The cost of SRIM service is only 45¢ domestic (60¢ foreign) for each complete microfiched report. Your SRIM service begins as soon as your order is received and processed and you will receive biweekly shipments thereafter. If you wish, your service will be backdated to furnish you microfiche of reports issued earlier.

Because of contractual arrangements with several Special Technology Groups, not all NTIS reports are distributed in the SRIM program. You will receive a notice in your microfiche shipments identifying the exceptionally priced reports not available through SRIM.

A deposit account with NTIS is required before this service can be initiated. If you have specific questions concerning this service, please call (703) 451-1558, or write NTIS, attention SRIM Product Manager.

This information product distributed by

NTIS U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, Virginia 22161

CMP-SPRCM-75-34

Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines

American Consulate General
Hong Kong

No. 847
November 24, 1975

This edition is printed in the United States of America for dissemination in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the west coast of Africa from material produced by the American Consulate General, Hong Kong. All queries concerning this edition should be sent to:

National Technical Information
Service (152.12)
U.S. Department of Commerce
Springfield, Virginia 22151

PRICES SUBJECT TO CHANGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/)

Fang La--A Profile - by Ch'i Mao 1

A Case More Than 300 Years Old - by Lo Ssu-ting 15

Comment on Sung Chiang's "Going to the Mountain" - by Shih Ch'uan 26

(Li-shih Yen-chiu /Historical Research/)

Tsarist Russia's Tool of Aggression Against China--the Mission of the Russian Orthodox Church - by Fang Hsiu 31

* * *

Reproduced by
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023

https://archive.org/details/selections-from-prc-magazines_1975-11-24_34

Fang La -- A Profile

by

Ch'i Mao (齐矛)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 14, 1975)

One day in the closing years of the Northern Sung Dynasty, misty clouds overhung the mountain ranges of Western Chekiang. On a hilltop in Ch'inghsi county (now Ch'un-an county) a young girl was seen practicing with her sword. After a few rounds of practice, she drew her legs together and sheathed her sword. Wiping off her sweat, she called: "Brother!"

On a whetstone stood a middle-aged man holding two sabers in his hands. Approaching her with solid steps, he asked smilingly: "What's the matter?"

"Brother, was it true that Ch'en Shuo-chen of the T'ang Dynasty practiced her swordsmanship here?"

"Yes. Ch'en Shuo-chen led the peasants of our home village to rise up against the rule of the T'ang emperor. It was she who greatly boosted the morale of the peasants. She was courageous and unyielding. She didn't submit even when she was killed by government troops."

Aroused by the story, the girl said animatedly: "Brother, she really was a great woman!"

"We are going to do the same, to do away with all injustice in this world!" said the brother in a low but firm voice.

The brother and sister were the famous leader of the peasant uprising Fang La and woman general Fang Pai-hua. In the 2nd year of Hsüan-ho (1120 A.D.) during the Northern Sung Dynasty, they led a million strong peasant insurgent force in the southeast. Although this uprising failed owing to limitations of class and historical conditions and was brutally suppressed by the feudal regime, the noble spirit of Fang La and the broad masses of insurgent peasants in challenging the reactionary rulers and advancing the revolutionary slogan of "equality," their defiance of violence in struggle, their refusal to be tempted by the offer of amnesty, and their lofty principle of maintaining dignity in face of death shone brilliantly in the history of peasant wars!

Oaths Taken at a Plantation

Fang La was born in a village of Ch'inghsi county, Muchou (now Chiente), Chekiang, of a middle-class family that operated a rubber plantation. Ch'inghsi was situated by the bank of the Hsin-an River, which sprang from the southern foot of the Huangshan Mountain to wriggle

through the thickets and lofty ranges of Western Chekiang, carving out a strategic area with steep slopes and deep ravines.

During the Hsüanho years when the Northern Sung Dynasty was about to crumble, the country was ravaged with a succession of disasters, and the people were so hungry that they even ate all tree bark and roots. The cruel landlords and bureaucrats smashed open the skulls of poor people dying of hunger to take out their brains with which to refine oil to make candle. Chao Chi, the Sung Emperor Hui Tsung, was extremely corrupt and dissipated. To satisfy his own needs of extravagance and pleasure, he intensified the exploitation of the people. As to the fertile and rich areas in the eastern and western parts of Chekiang, the extent of exploitation was even more unbearable. The "head tax" alone broke up countless families. A ballad that spread around Muchou at the time said: "Overdue is the head tax I owe, so I am dragged into the hall in chains. If I do not pay up, my head will be chopped off, and who would pity you?" The pleasure-seeking Chao Chi also ordered that the various regions offer him preciously rare flowers and stones to decorate his garden. Chao Chi's favorite courtier Chu Mien set up a "Suchou-Hangchou Contribution Bureau" especially for the purpose of collecting flowers and stones from the people south of the Yangtze. If a family owned a stone or a plant that looked rare enough, the ruffians of the "Contribution Bureau" would surely burst in and wrap it up with a piece of yellow paper, making it the property of the "royal" family of Chao. If the stone or plant was too large or too tall to be taken out of the house, its walls would be pulled down and the house ransacked. The people deeply hated this. The class contradictions were extremely acute.

Fang La was a man of justice. When he saw that some poor people in the village were cruelly beaten up by officials for failing to pay their head taxes, he was filled with anger. At times, he would pay their taxes with what little money he could spare. The greedy officials, thinking he was rich, wanted to blackmail him and asked him to offer them a precious stone. Fang La refused. The officials did not give up and on several occasions despatched yamen guards to threaten him, destroying one of his houses.

Fang La could bear this no longer, so he talked to his wife Shao and sister Pai-hua. Pai-hua said: "Too bad. The little emperor doesn't let us live in peace."

Fang La said: "We're not alone in these sufferings. Some people in the village were hanged or killed themselves because they couldn't pay up. An old man went into hiding and he was so hungry that he couldn't move. His eyeballs were plucked away by a crow today. There is no way to make a living unless we rebel."

"Right!" Pai-hua exclaimed, swinging her fist. "Let's first finish the county magistrate, and then those devils of the Contribution Bureau!"

"Keep your voice down," Shao warned. "Don't let people next door hear you."

Living next door was Fang Keng, the "borough head" of the neighborhood. Though he was known to be Fang La's brother, he was an entirely different character. Fang Keng was greedy and tried hard to please the officials. Overhearing the conversation of Fang La with his family, he raced to town the same night to report to the county officials. By the time Fang La was aware of this, it was too late. In this critical situation, Fang La decided to advance his uprising by using the "Vegetarian Faith Serving the Devil" organization, which had a large peasant following.

The "Vegetarian Faith Serving the Devil" was a kind of religion that spread secretly in eastern and western Chekiang at that time. It stood for a vegetarian diet, thriftiness and mutual assistance, such that wherever its members went, they would be served meals and given accommodation by other members who did not necessarily have to know them. They did not worship gods or the Buddha, nor did they worship their ancestors. They advocated "equality under law with no distinction of rank." This reflected the poor peasants' simple wish to change the feudal system and establish a society free from exploitation. The Faith had a "chief," whose powers and authority all the members must respect. Fang La, being a local "chief," had great influence among the followers.

One night in the 10th month of the second year of Hsüanho, Fang La, having failed to find Fang Keng, gathered the village's young faithfuls in his plantation. He entertained them with beef and wine. Raising his glass, Fang La addressed the crowd loudly: "I invited you to come here tonight to discuss an important matter. A state is like a family. If the younger members of the family toil all year round, and the father and elder brothers do not toil but eat and wear the best and beat up the younger members, would you be willing to be the younger members?"

"Never!" the young fellows answered in unison.

Fang La continued: "The father and elder brothers not only squander but serve our enemies, so that they become richer and then come to bully us. We younger members fight on the front, but our father and elder brothers keep offering the enemies with money and silk. What would you say about this?"

"Ridiculous," said the young fellows, raising their fists angrily.

Fang La himself could not help bursting into tears of anger. After a pause, he spoke even faster: "Now taxes and corvee are heavy, and the officials squeeze us. What we grow or raise is all taken away by them. But the emperor and the court ministers and generals are enjoying themselves at our expense. We toil all year round, yet our wives and

children are shivering in cold and hunger. Can we still stand all this?"

These words greatly aroused the peasants. They cried aloud: "No, we can't." "Why must we wait here to die? Let's act!"

Fang La jumped onto a big rock and talked even louder: "If we all rise up and rebel, poor people in other areas will join us. Let's first take the areas of the southeast and defend across the river. There will be no more taxes and corvee, and people will live a good life. When the court loses the treasure of the southeast, it will step up its exploitation in the central plains, and by then the people there will rise up to rebel. In less than ten years we will certainly be able to unify the country." After saying this, Fang La raised both arms, looked at the sky and said loudly: "Our slogan is 'equality under law, no distinction of rank!'"

This speech was a brilliant declaration of rebellion, embracing a far-sighted revolutionary program. The peasants, wiping away their tears, emptied their cups. They cried aloud: "Let's live and die together, never betray each other!" So, they rushed to the South Mountains, where they made bamboo swords and wooden clubs. They hoisted a yellow banner on a rubber tree. They called Fang La "Holy Lord" with "Yunglo" as his title as emperor to pose an open challenge to the Northern Sung Dynasty. They chose Pangyüan Grotto with an exceptionally favorable terrain as the base area of the insurgent army. The hard-pressed people flocked to the insurgent army, which in a matter of days swelled to several tens of thousands of men.

On November 19, the insurgent army took the county town of Ch'inghsi after wiping out 5,000 government troops.

Overrunning Three Prefectures in a Row

After taking Ch'inghsi, Fang La ordered his army to march head on to Muchou.

The governor of Muchou, the notorious Chang Hui-yen, was about to depart for Ch'ingchou, Shantung, on transfer. Before he could do so, Muchou was surrounded by the insurgent army. Chang didn't dare to fight and wanted to get away. The commander of Chiente county, T'ung Shu, a greedy and vicious man who had the green eyes of a serpent and the whiskers of a rat, told Chang boastfully: "Let me take 500 men and chop off Fang La's head."

When Fang La arrived at the gate of the city, he saw that the walls were high and the moat was deep. Since most of his men were armed with only bamboo spears and wood choppers, he decided to take Muchou by strategy. He summoned a young general Fang Ch'i-fo and his sister Fang Pai-hua to discuss the matter. "Don't worry," the young man said. "It won't be difficult to take Muchou." Fang Pai-hua suggested: "It's said among the people that our insurgent army has Heavenly soldiers.

Let's dress up as soldiers from Heaven. The women will all wear red shirts and green trousers. Then we can scare them off. How about it?"

"Excellent!" Fang La chuckled. "The government troops kill and burn. They are most afraid of gods and spirits. Let's dress like gods and devils. But, of course, this won't be enough. We must still fight them hard. Ch'i-fo, lead your men to make the enemy come out and cut off their retreat. Then they will be all yours." The two left to carry out their orders.

T'ung Shu led his 500 men out of the city. He saw only high mountains on both sides but not the insurgents. He was puzzled. A soldier whispered into T'ung Shu's ears: "They say the insurgents are divine warriors from Heaven, appearing from nowhere and disappearing into nowhere." Scared, T'ung Shu, however, pressed on. When he arrived at a pass, a sudden gush of wind brought down a hail of sand and stones from the hill. Through the dust and mist, he saw, vaguely, a large group of "fairies" dressed in red and green pouncing down the mountain with swords in hand.

"The divine soldiers are coming!" The government troops cried out with panic, turned on their heels and ran. T'ung Shu tried unsuccessfully to call them back, and he had no alternative but to follow them. Within seconds, the "divine soldiers" descended and finished off a great number of government troops. Fang Ch'i-fo and his men appeared from the ground, seized the weapons from the enemies and started killing them. Most of the 500 government troops were killed, and T'ung, ashamed of going back to Muchou, fled to some other place.

With the capture of Muchou, Fang La split his army into two parts, one of which was led by Fang Pai-hua and drove toward Hangchou. Fang La accompanied her to as far as the bank of the Fuch'un River. Pointing at the distant Hangchou with his whip, he said: "After I have taken Hsichou, I'll return to join you to attack Hangchow, and see who gets into the city first." "I will be waiting for you in Hangchou city," Fang Pai-hua promised with pride.

Fang La took the other part of the army to march back west along the Hsing-an River. Taking the empty space between Ch'ienlikang Mountain and the T'ienmu Mountain, he entered the Hsichou area. Defending Hsichou was the "Southeast General" Kuo Shih-chung. Kuo led ten thousand men out to meet the insurgent army, and encountered a brave general under Fang La, Pa Ta-wang. The two fought each other for half an hour. Pa slashed Kuo in two with one cut, and the insurgent army broke into the city. Pa then marched north, closing in on Hsüan-chou.

Meanwhile, Fang Pai-hua was leading her troops triumphantly right up to the Fengshan Gate of Hangchou. She set up a camp in the mountain and prepared for the attack on the city.

On seeing the advent of the insurgent army, the governor of Hangchou, Chao T'ing, packed up all the gold and jewels he had scraped from the people and fled, leaving behind a civil officer, Chao Yüeh, and a military officer, Ch'en Chien. Both of them, however, had their own plans. "Ch'en Chien loved his beautiful concubines, and Chao Yüeh loved his wealth." They went up to the head of the city wall, when they saw that the insurgents were putting up their ladders against the wall. A woman general was taking the lead in scaling a ladder. Stones and arrows poured down like rain from above. The woman general brandished her sword to ward off the stones and arrows and climbed even faster. Ch'en Chien yelled: "Fire! Use fire!" The ladder was set on fire and appeared to break. But the woman general continued her climb and leaped to the head of the city wall just when the ladder collapsed. She killed the advancing government troops with her sword. At this instant, large numbers of insurgents scaled the wall and the government troops were forced to retreat. Ch'en Chien started to run. Fang Pai-hua ran after him. Suddenly she was shot in the head by an arrow and fell.....

Shouts from the southwest shattered the air. Fang La's army was also attacking the city. Fang La had Ch'en Chien and Chao Yüeh tied up to be tried by the people of the city. Meanwhile, he was looking for Fang Pai-hua and laying plans for the defense of the city. However, when Fang La found her, this outstanding woman general had stopped breathing. She looked serious, her eyebrows raised and both fists held tight, as if she were saying: "March on to Chinling! March on to Piencing!"

Sung Troops Marched South

The sharp turn in the situation in the southeast greatly shook Piencing, capital of the feudal dynasty. Although in the north a group of 36 men headed by Sung Chiang was rebelling, yet in the eyes of the Sung rulers, they were but a bunch of brigands moving here and there with no interest in occupying prefectures and counties. They did not constitute too great a threat, and, moreover, amnesty was offered to them in the 12th month of the 1st year of Hsüanho. An answer from them was expected. Fang La, on the other hand, was bringing disorder to Chekiang, proclaiming himself as king in the territory he seized. This really worried Chao Chi so much that he broke into a cold sweat. Chekiang was an area where the wealth of the whole country was concentrated, and the taxes and grain collected by Northern Sung in this region kept on growing. Take the tea tax for example. In 1019 A.D. (3rd year of the reign of T'ienhsi, the Sung emperor Chen Tsung), the "tea tax" in the southeast was 30,000 strings of cash, but a hundred years later, during the years of Chengho of Emperor Hui Tsung, this increased to more than 4 million strings, an increase of 133 times. Thus, the uprisings in Chekiang cut off the major contribution of wealth to the feudal court, and that was what made Chao Chi and his gang so worried!

Chao Chi hastily ordered T'ung Kuan to lead an army to suppress the rebellion. The army was composed of three parts: one was made up of

the imperial troops defending the capital; the second was composed of lancers of Tingchou (Ch'angte in Hunan) and Lichou (Li county in Hunan); and the third part was made up of crack troops from Shansi and Shensi. They numbered 150,000 men in all. Liu Yen-ch'ing, the veteran general of the Northwest faction was named field commander and Wang Ping his deputy. Although Chao Chi used all the crack troops in the country to deal with Fang La, he was still worried. When the army was about to set out, he rushed to it in plainclothes. Holding T'ung Kuan by the hand, he said: "I leave the situation of the Southeast entirely in your hands, general. In case of emergency, you need not report to me. Deal with it as you please in my name." So, T'ung's 150,000-man army marched south along the Pien River in moonlight.

What the Sung court feared most was that the insurgents might take Chinling (now Nanking) and use this important strategic area by the Yangtze River. Therefore, T'ung Kuan was told: Chinling is a key area, take Chiangningfu first and hold on to Chenchiang. So, T'ung Kuan personally camped at Chenchiang and ordering Wang Ping to hold the mouth of the Yangtze River. Liu Yen-ch'ing was ordered to defend Chinling and impose a blockade on the Yangtze River. Strategically, the Sung army was a step ahead of the insurgent army.

At Hangchou, Fang La called a military conference to decide on the next strategic move.

Fang La said excitedly: "Ever since we met at my plantation, we have marched from victory to victory. People from all parts of the country have rebelled and rallied to our cause.... Our army has rapidly grown to nearly one million strong. My plan is this: consolidate our defense in Hangchou, try eastern Chekiang first, send a big army back to take the various counties there in coordination with various insurgent forces, then redeploy our troops for the northward march to take Chinling. What's your idea about this?"

Li Chiang, a student of the royal academy, was a young intellectual who had recently joined the insurgent army and who warmly supported the peasant revolution in opposing Chao's reactionary rule. On hearing Fang La's opinion, he rose to speak:

"The Holy Lord's assessment of the situation in eastern Chekiang is indeed inspiring. Under these circumstances, I think we should direct our victorious forces to take Chinling to hold the natural barriers of the Yangtze River, to cut off the communications of the enemy between north and south, and so to insure that the whole region south of the Yangtze is in our hands. If we turn back and hover around eastern Chekiang, the enemy will surely make a long thrust, putting us on the defensive."

Fang La liked this young scholar for daring to put forward different opinions and talking about them in detail. But he did not endorse his plan, so he explained: "I myself was born into a middle-class family, and I rose up against the rulers only because they bullied and oppressed the peasants too harshly. Now, there are still a great

number of people in eastern Chekiang who are suffering oppression. If we do not rescue them first, my heart will not be at peace."

Lü Chiang said: "I heard that on the night the oaths were taken, the Holy Lord planned to capture the various prefectures south of the Yangtze at one stroke, defend by the river, and unify the country in ten years. This is a correct plan and you mustn't change it!"

Fang Ch'i-fo saw that both had sound arguments and neither was able to convince the other, so he suggested: "Holy Lord, leave the matter of the northward march to me. Now Shih Sheng in Suchou has risen, and he really needs help. Give me 30,000 men and I will take Hsiuchou (now Chiahsing in Chekiang) first, then thrust into Suchow and take Chinling."

"Fine!" Fang La exclaimed. "You may have 60,000 men to attack Hsiuchou. Lü Chiang will remain to hold Hangchow. Cheng Mo-wang will march south to attack Wuchou (now Chinhua in Chekiang), and I'll be there in time too."

While this military conference was in progress, T'ung Kuan was still north of the Yangtze. The insurgent army failed to recognize the significance of taking Chinling first, but the sly and cunning T'ung Kuan saw this. This was a mistake made by the insurgent army. Although the insurgent army was courageous in battle, fighting east and west, and even took the heavily defended towns of Wuchou and Ch'uchou (now Lishui in Chekiang) in southern Chekiang, it loosened its grip of the north front which had a decisive significance for the entire war situation. Eventually, it was unable to resist the government troops marching from the north and gradually was forced to take the defensive militarily.

After the Hangchou military conference, Fang Ch'i-fo led his army to attack the city of Hsiuchou. After four days of bitter fighting, he failed to take the city. T'ung Kuan's troops, however, had already crossed the Yangtze and, after eliminating the peasant insurgents at Suchou, swiftly moved south along the canal to get behind Fang Ch'i-fo, take Haining and Ch'ungte, and encircle the 60,000 insurgents in a narrow delta area between Hsiuchou, Haining and Ch'ungte. The situation was extremely unfavorable to the insurgent forces as it was impossible to take Hsiuchou while the route back to Hangchou was cut off. Fang Ch'i-fo and his men battled furiously and broke out from the northern flank. By the time they reached the small town -- Wuchen in T'unghsiang county -- not far from Lake T'aihu, they had already lost 40,000 men.

The people of Wuchen received the insurgents as if they were their dear ones. They cooked for them and dressed the wounded. The insurgents who had not eaten for a whole day, were so moved that tears rolled down their cheeks. The inhabitants wanted the insurgent forces to stay. Fang Ch'i-fo was badly wounded. As he struggled to get ashore from the boat, he told them: "We're grateful for what you've done for us. But we can't stay long. We must break the blockade of the government troops and go back to Hangchou. However, we shall be back."

A long line of boats set sail toward the south. It was raining heavily. Several thousand people of Wuchen lined the bank tearfully to say farewell to their men. Later, the people of Wuchen erected a pavilion by the river bank, a pavilion which they called "Send Off with Tears Pavilion." The swaying willow branches by the side of the pavilion seemed to implore the return of the insurgent army.

Condemning Capitulation on the City Wall

Fang Ch'i-fo reached the outer defense perimeter of Hangchou with the Wang Ping-led troops and the Hsiho troops under Hsin Hsing-tsung and Yang Wei-chung hot on his heels.

At this moment, Fang La had rushed back to Hangchou from the southern front and immediately made arrangements to strengthen the city fortifications in preparation for wiping out the advancing government troops.

While making an inspection in the city, Fang La saw that the insurgent troops and the people of Hangchou were working together to fortify the defense works. He took over a rock from a young insurgent soldier with a wounded arm and placed it on the battlement. Then he turned round and asked the young man with concern: "Little brother, where did you get that wound?"

"Under the gate of Hsiuchou city. Holy Lord, I killed six government soldiers. When we were breaking out, I was bitten by a fierce dog. It's nearly healed now."

Fang La was pleased and praised him. He pointed to outside the city and said: "Fierce dogs are coming. Get prepared and beat them hard."

"Holy Lord, an arrow with a letter attached was shot into the city from the outside this morning. The letter said the emperor wants us to lay down our arms."

"What are you going to do?" Fang La deliberately provoked him.

"Fight!" the little warrior replied without the least hesitation. "We aren't spineless. Our knees aren't made to kneel!"

While they were talking, Fang Ch'i-fo dragged along a man dressed in the official Sung uniform and threw him at Fang La's feet. The fellow got up and said: "I am an envoy sent by the court. I want to see your leader."

"What business have you here?" Fang La shouted at him.

The fellow, struck by Fang La's sternness, replied haltingly: "I....I was ordered to come here. It's none of my business. The emperor has issued an edict." As he was saying, he produced a piece of paper from his pocket. "The emperor, in consideration of the fact that you were driven by circumstances and taken in by evil men....."

"Shut up!" Fang Ch'i-fo shouted at him. "If you dare to talk nonsense, I'll tear you to pieces!"

Fang La waved his hand at Fang Ch'i-fo and said to the Sung official who had dropped flat onto the ground in fright: "Go on. Let's hear what good could there be from that mouth of yours."

The Sung official pulled himself together and continued: "The emperor, understanding the sufferings of the common people, has decided to remove extra taxes and dismissed Chu Mien from office. The people in the southeast, bathing in the emperor's act of grace, may now return to their homes and till the land in peace."

Fang La laughed coldly: "This is a hoax. Frightened by our peasant insurgent forces, they have to tell lies. Let me ask you this: Why are the people at Pienching still asked to do corvee labor to build a pleasure house? Why, while famine is spreading in the central plains, are the emperor and his court officials still leading an extravagant life? Why does the emperor still keep 20,000 Taoists with the sweat and blood of the people so that they may pray for his longevity? Is this what you mean by understanding the sufferings of the people? Is this bathing in the emperor's act of grace?"

The Sung official said: "My Lord, you mustn't be angry with His Majesty. His Majesty is generous to you all. If you accept amnesty, all your crimes will be forgiven and you will be made a noble and a high official. By then, my Lord, you'll take a different view of the Emperor." After he said this, the Sung official stole a glance at Fang La's face.

Resting his hand on the handle of his sword, Fang La laughed loudly: "Ha, ha! If I surrender, I would be made an official and given the opportunity to visit the emperor's 'pleasure house.' Is that what you mean? How interesting! But this sword of mine." He stopped laughing and drew the blade half way out of the sheath. "It was made by an old blacksmith at Muchou. He gave it to me, so that I might use it to serve the poor. How can I have the mood to visit the pleasure house. Sooner or later, I'll destroy it and the emperor too!"

The Sung official wanted to slip away, but not entirely giving up, he said: "My Lord, I have another piece of news for you. The 36 brigands in Shantung headed by Sung Chiang accepted the offer of amnesty and enlistment in Haichou in December last year. His Majesty has bestowed on Sung Chiang a governorship. Sung is really a hero who knows the time. What do Your Highness feel about this?"

Fang La was furious, and drew out his sword. Fang Ch'i-fo kicked the Sung official onto the ground and put one foot on him while reaching for his saber. The wounded soldier, a sword in hand, was going to kill him. Fang La made a gesture with his hand: "Hold it! Let's keep a living tongue. Let him take a message back. Tell that

eunuch T'ung Kuan: the peasant insurgent army is determined to fight to the finish. I, Fang La, will never sell out the interests of the poor nor lead the million brothers to surrender. Never! He who gives away the destiny of the poor for an official post will be cursed for a thousand years and will not come to a good end. Go back and tell your masters this. Get out!"

Like grabbing a chick, Fang Ch'i-fo lifted the Sung official, carried him to the gate and threw him out.

"Ha, ha....!" The insurgent troops on the city wall could not help laughing to their heart's content.

Bloody Battle at Pangyüan

Having failed to induce the insurgents to surrender, T'ung Kuan adopted a plan offered by his colonel Han Shih-chung, ambushed the insurgent forces at Peikuanyen, and took Ch'ient'ang. The insurgent army stuck to the Hangchou city and refused to come out to fight. While waiting for the arrival of his reinforcements led by Wang Huan, T'ung Kuan also made no move but had Hangchou heavily besieged, and cut it off from all external assistance. In the city food was fast running out. About ten days later, Wang Huan arrived. Sung Chiang, the shameless renegade who betrayed the peasant revolutionary cause, also arrived with his men. It was then that T'ung Kuan ordered the attack. Fang La and his 80,000 insurgent warriors fought a bitter six-day battle. When food finally ran out, he gave the order to break out by separate groups. On February 18, Fang Ch'i-fo led the last group of 20,000 men to break out only to be intercepted by government troops. The insurgents fought bravely and most of them died. Only a thousand or more succeeded in breaking out with Fang Ch'i-fo. They caught up with Fang La's forces. They retreated toward their base at Pangyüan Grotto via Fuyang, T'unglu and Muchou. On March 27, Wang Ping captured Muchou.

In March the spring water rose in southern Anhwei. In Hsichou, Pa Ta-wang was worried about the fighting in the upper reaches of the Hsin-an River. He wished the river water could carry him eastward to fight the enemy. At this time, actually, a tough battle was about to unfold before him.

During the attack on Hangchou, T'ung Kuan had ordered Liu Yen-ch'ing, who was guarding Chinling, to send his deputies Liu Chen and Yang K'o-shih to Anhwei from the east and occupy the southern part of the province so as to get behind the base area of the insurgent forces. In early March, Liu Chen and Yang K'o-shih moved along the Ch'ing-i River valley and sprang a surprise attack on Ching county, from thence Yang attacked Chingte county. Meanwhile, Liu Chen attacked Ningkuo county from Hsüanchou. These two enemy columns formed a pincer offensive against Hsichou. Pa Ta-wang fought with the enemy forces outside the city, but failed to hold the city. Then Pa laid an ambush in P'an village outside the city and fought the enemy till mid-night,

inflicting heavy casualties on him. But Pa himself was seriously wounded and had to retreat toward Pangyüan Grotto, with Liu Chen and Yang K'o-shih in hot pursuit.

Thus, T'ung Kuan ordered his troops to advance on Pangyüan Grotto from Muchou in the east and Hsichou in the west at the same time. Insurgent forces in various areas rushed to help, but were intercepted and tied down by government forces. On April 19, Wang Ping occupied Ch'inghsi. On April 23, Liu Chen and Yang K'o-shih first arrived at the southern approach to Pangyüan Grotto and sent up smoke signals as originally planned, directing the various Sung armies to move toward Pangyüan Grotto.

Then Wang Huan and his deputy commander Sung Chiang arrived at the southern approach. Wang Huan had always been Wang Ping's rear guard. The renegade Sung Chiang was also anxious to win some merit in the battle to "exterminate" Fang La. The smoke signal at the southern approach meant the last chance to get a promotion.

Meanwhile, another government force of 30,000 men also arrived at the southern approach. It was led by Huang Ti and Liu Kuang-pi, who were specially sent by T'ung Kuan to take part in the combined assault on Pangyüan Grotto.

The arrival of government forces at the southern approach caused great anxiety to Han Shih-chung, a deputy of Wang Yüan. This colonel was promoted to be a general for the plan he offered back in Hangchou. This whetted his appetite for promotion. On seeing the fire signal, he handpicked 50 of his faithful followers and raced to the southern approach.

On seeing the black smoke at the southern approach, Wang Ping sighed with dismay. The old and greedy Hsin Hsing-tsung was even more irritated. He was the vanguard of Wang Ping's army and did not want to be overtaken by the western-route forces. So, he ordered his men to get there as quickly as possible.

In the small hours of April 24, Pangyüan Grotto was heavily besieged by the government forces from five routes, numbering a total of 300,000 men. Under the personal command of Fang La, the 200,000 insurgents massed in the grotto and unfolded a breathtaking battle to defend their base.

Fang La took up positions at Chienmen ridge at the southern approach to the grotto. The government troops fired their cannon at the ridge and started climbing the mountain. As they got to the mountain pass, they were suddenly pounced upon by the insurgents led by Fang La and suffered heavy casualties. After bitter fighting around the clock, more than 30,000 government soldiers were killed while over 10,000 insurgents lost their lives on Chienmen Ridge. As the Ridge was vulnerable to attack, Fang La ordered his men to move across the Shungmao Ridge and retreat to the Yenchiahsi beaches. There they met another superior enemy force. After a fierce battle, Fang La lost his horse and his sword, and retreated into the grotto. The Sung forces killed and burned in the base area. More than 100,000

insurgents laid down their lives heroically. Bitter fighting went on throughout the night. Quiet gradually returned at daybreak. Wang Ping ordered a search of the mountains. The government troops burned all houses and killed all persons they came upon. According to records kept by scholars of the landlord class, countless people were hanged or hacked to death in an area with a radius of 85 li. Despite this massacre, the enemy was still unable to find the secret entrance to the grotto where Fang La hid.

Han Shih-chung and his death squad of 50 men searched all over the mountain, but failed to locate the entrance to the grotto. At this time, Fang Keng, who betrayed Fang La and had hidden in Ch'inghsi for a long time, appeared again and played the hunting dog of the feudal dynasty. With his help, Han Shih-chung was able to locate the entrance to the grotto. A battle with the insurgents guarding the entrance ensued. Pa Ta-wang, who was nursing his wound in the grotto, came out and took on Han Shih-chung. Han's men, after killing the guards, turned to Pa. Still wounded and outnumbered, Pa was captured.

The grotto was dark and deep. Han, his face smeared with blood after it was slashed by Pa, dared not advance further. Crouched at the entrance, he ordered his men to go in. Sounds of fighting were heard inside and soon several bodies were tossed out. They were Han's men. Han sent more men in. More enemy reinforcements arrived. After several hours of fighting, Fang La, though brave, could not hold on any more. He was taken, and his wife, Shao, and son Fang Hao and his generals Fang Ch'i-fo and Lü Chiang also fell into the enemy's hands.

Han Shih-chung came out of the grotto and bumped into Hsin Hsing-tsung. Han saluted and boasted: "Your humble general went into the cave alone and captured 52 men including Fang La." Hsin was jealous and said with the airs of a superior: "I'll take the prisoners back to headquarters. Continue the search." Han cried aloud: "How can you, sir, take my prisoners and claim the credit?" Hsin's men came forward to take the prisoners and clashed with Han's men. Finally, Han gave in. Hsin counted the prisoners and found there were only 39. Thirteen, including Lü Chiang and Fang Ch'i-fo, slipped away while the enemies were quarrelling with each other.

On August 24, Pienching, the capital of Northern Sung, was a gloomy place, with clouds overhanging the city. Fang La, the leader of the million-strong insurgent army, was executed after he refused to submit.

The Sung court, thinking that Fang La's death removed a serious threat to them, ordered the "pleasure garden" to be reopened, reactivated the "Contribution Bureau," and had Chu Mien reinstated. But was Fang La really dead? No, he was not. He went on fighting. Look:

From the insurgents' base, Lü Chiang, who escaped earlier, charged toward the enemy's position with 70,000 insurgents who survived, shouting, "Holy Lord, give us your blessings."

In eastern Chekiang, Fang Ch'i-fo, hoisting Fang La's yellow banner, was fighting in the mountains.

At Huangyen, Lü Shih-nang was fighting with the Sung troops on a steep cliff.

At Shangyüan Grotto, the insurgents, faced with the brutal massacre by the shameless renegade Sung Chiang, chose to die rather than submitted!

At that time, no one believed that Fang La was dead. Even a few years later, word was passed around that Fang La was living in a small mountain village in Hsichou, Anhwei, and that the Fang La who died in Pienching was an insurgent who took Fang's name and died for him. Whether this legend was true or not was not proven, but Fang La, leaving behind his weapon, robe and boots, left with later generations a dauntless heroic image and a lasting memory.

* * *

A Case More Than 300 Years Old

- Comments on Chin Sheng-t'an's mutilation of Water Margin and the dispute it has evoked

by

Lo Ssu-ting (罗思鼎)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 14, 1975)

Water Margin in circulation originally included the 100-chapter and 120-chapter editions. Toward the end of the Ming Dynasty, however, a person named Chin Sheng-t'an chopped the 100-chapter version and produced a 70-chapter edition. This was followed by people attacking or defending the mutilated version, turning the ensuing controversy into a case that has lasted more than 300 years. Has the mutilated version truthfully reflected the outlook of the original edition? Why is it that so many people have expressed keen interest in it? This is the subject of this article.

I

Marxism holds: Chin Sheng-t'an chopped more than 20 chapters from Water Margin. After the chopping, it is no longer truthful.

But Chin Sheng-t'an was quite proud of having mutilated Water Margin. Bragging about the mutilation, he said: "The 70-chapter book serves as a grand denouement to a comprehensive narrative. The reader will find that everything is included and nothing is missing. Lo Kuan-chung should be ridiculed for fixing up the dog's tail since this only reveals his hideousness."* As to the 100-chapter and 120-chapter versions, Chin identified them as false and untruthful stuff, "just popular editions with indiscriminate alterations by foolhardy and conceited people."** He regarded his 70-chapter version as truly the genuine "original edition."

Facts are exactly the opposite. It was Chin who was not truthful. He omitted a small portion of the second half of Water Margin, invented a chapter on Lu Chün-i's "nightmare" and concluded the narrative with Chi Shu-yeh killing all the 108 Liangshan heroes. Lu Hsün was particularly displeased with this, so he wrote an article "About Chin Sheng-t'an" in which he criticized the 70-chapter version as "a dragonfly

---

* Photostat Edition of Chin Sheng-t'an's Commentaries on and Alterations of the Original Kuanhuat'ang Edition of "Water Margin," Vol. 75, p. 1.

** Ibid., Vol. 75, p. 23.

without its tail" and "without the truthfulness of the original work." He pointed out incisively: "Probably he did not have the original edition so he made the deletions merely on the basis of his own ideas. His reference to the original edition is nothing more than a means of 'using the original'." (Historical Evolution of Chinese Fiction)

Chapter 42 of Water Margin is the key section of the whole book. The author brings out the capitulationist theme of the book through an order issued by the Goddess of Ninth Heaven and lays down the main thread for the episodes that took place after Chapter 71. The Goddess made it quite plain to Sung Chiang when she said: "You can carry out the wish of Heaven. In all affairs be honest and upright. In official affairs support the state and make the people live in peace. When affairs are wrong, rectify them. When you have completed your meritorious duties, you shall be my guest." The Goddess then left Sung four "divine remarks": "When you find Shu, luck will be with you; when you meet Kao, nothing ominous will happen. From the north to the south you will succeed remarkably in both places." In the 70-chapter version the four "divine remarks" are deleted but the episodes before the "change from evil to good" are retained. Since the portion after Chapter 71 is left out, Sung Chiang loses the opportunity to pledge loyalty and surrender to the Sung imperial court. Thus the thread underlying the development of ideas in the first and larger section of the work is lost also. There are innumerable similar loopholes in the 70-chapter version. To plug these loopholes Chin Sheng-t'an deleted some sections here and chopped a few more there without being able to chop away the capitulationist theme. As a result, the whole book is full of imperfections. In bragging about his accomplishment, wasn't Chin deceiving himself and duping others?

Chin claimed his tailless Water Margin faithfully reflected the author's real intention. This is also not true. Although the book was written in late Yüan and early Ming, the episodes which made up the story originated from hearsay which was in circulation since the Southern Sung. Additions and alterations contributed by different narrators through the ages and the embellishments by miscellaneous operas gradually enriched their contents. Episodes about Sung Chiang's acceptance of amnesty and his fight against Fang La were included in either Sung plays or Yüan operas. When the narrative Water Margin came out in book form, the author spared no effort to extol and embellish Sung Chiang the capitulationist. Chin Sheng-t'an's assertion that the Water Margin author "merely expressed his bitter resentment against Sung Chiang"* only proves that Chin himself was delirious. For despite Chin's painstaking deletions and alterations, Sung Chiang in the 70-chapter version still remains a faithful feudal lackey rather than a "brigand chieftain" who "persuaded the others to

---

* Photostat Edition of Chin Sheng-t'an's Commentaries and Alterations of the Original Kuanhuat'ang Edition of "Water Margin," Vol. 3, p. 1.

join the brigands."* The outcome of Sung Chiang's advocacy of a capitulationist line could not but result in his acceptance of the amnesty and enlistment offer and his setting out to fight Fang La. In allowing Sung Chiang to be beheaded in the "nightmare" scene, Chin went against the real intention of the author to use Sung Chiang to preach capitulationism.

Ching Sheng-t'an's real name was Jen-jui but he adopted Sheng-t'an as his other name. "Jen-jui" means "an outstanding man among men," and "Sheng-t'an" means having the "approbation" of the "sages." This shows that he considered himself an apologist for feudalism. However, the mutilation of Water Margin, in his view, was to perpetuate the teachings of the sages and to reflect truthfully and comprehensively the viewpoint and intention of the feudal ruling class as a whole. But there is no truthfulness in what he did. Because of different economic and political interests that existed within the feudal ruling class, different cliques and factions were formed. Chin Sheng-t'an himself offended certain gentry who held office, and was beheaded in the early years of the Ch'ing Dynasty for his involvement in the "weeping at the temple case." This illustrates that he was merely identified with a certain clique or faction of the landlord class. His mutilation of Water Margin could not possibly have represented the viewpoint and intention of the feudal ruling class as a whole, but could only represent the interests of a certain faction of the landlord class.

History loves to mock people. Chin Sheng-t'an considered himself, and himself only, as a follower of the sages. He did not think Sung Chiang of Water Margin was qualified to be an apologist for feudalism. Some people of the feudal class, however, regarded Chin as a damnable heretic and they did not think that Chin was qualified to be an apologist for feudalism. Chin had Sung, who was loyal to the feudal court, beheaded in Lu Chün-i's nightmare, but he himself was decapitated by the very feudal court to which he pledged allegiance. Chin would not tolerate Sung's opportunist action in turning to Liangshan. In the same vein, the feudal yamen would not tolerate acts of transgression committed by Chin such as his "weeping at the temple." This complicated and subtle state of affairs could be completely understood from the class roots. The different political factions within the landlord class reflected the gaps and distinctions in their economic status, origin and upbringing. As long as these gaps and distinctions existed, it would be inevitable for different factions to exist. The inherent greed of the landlord class determined the inevitable and desperate strivings among its different factions on the question of redistribution of property and power. Chin Sheng-t'an proceeded from the standpoint of the faction which was in favor of suppressing the brigands toward the end of the Ming period. He regarded Sung Chiang

---

* Photostat Edition of Chin Sheng-t'an's Commentaries and Alterations of the Original Kuanhuat'ang Edition of "Water Margin," Vol. 39, p. 5 and Vol. 22, p. 1.

of the capitulationists favored by the faction which preached enlistment and appeasement as "heretical" so he had Sung decapitated in a nightmare. Local officials in regions south of the Yangtze River in the early Ch'ing period, however, proceeded from the standpoint of the faction in power at the imperial court. They regarded Chin Sheng-t'an of the faction without power as "heretical" because he made some minor trouble in the "case about weeping in the temple" so they likewise had him decapitated on the execution ground. In the last analysis, Chin's "killing" of Sung and his own execution are the outcome of the dog-fight within the landlord class.

II

The 70-chapter version with Chin's commentaries at that time and in subsequent periods evoked a stormy debate of no mean dimensions, containing in fact the elements of a political case. This was a continuation of the factional strife within the reactionary ruling class, that is, a continuation of the struggle in real life between Sung Chiang and Kao Ch'iu in Water Margin.

Kao Ch'iu was stubborn and muddle-headed. He was against alternately "suppressing" and "appeasing" the brigands, stressing suppression and abandoning amnesty and enlistment moves. Chin Sheng-t'an was a man like Kao Ch'iu. He preferred slaughter to moves for inducing surrender, wanting only Chi Shu-yeh and not Sung Chiang. Lu Hsün made this profound comment: "How muddle-headed it is to leave out only the other minor half of Water Margin and dream of a 'Chi Shu-yeh' to kill Sung Chiang and all the rest." ("About Chin Sheng-t'an") The butcher knives of the Chi Shu-yehs could only slaughter the bodies of the revolutionary peasants, but the deceit practiced by capitulationists like Sung Chiang could disintegrate the fighting will of the revolutionary peasants, something that could not be accomplished by a hundred or a thousand Chi Shu-yehs. Lenin once pointed out: "In order to maintain their rule, all oppressing classes are in need of two social functions: one is the function of the hangman and the other, the priest." ("The Bankruptcy of the Second International") In suppressing and disintegrating the Liangshan insurgent army, Chi Shu-yeh carried out the hangman's function while Sung Chiang acted as the priest. If all the Sung Chiangs were put to death, then who would serve as the reactionary priest to appease and hoodwink the revolutionary peasantry? Besides, in fighting Fang La, Sung Chiang was not only not inferior to Chi Shu-yeh in carrying out the functions of the counter-revolutionary hangman but also excelled him.

In the Ch'ing Dynasty most of those who stood on the side of Chin Sheng-t'an were big and small Kao Ch'ius. They all stood for suppression and against amnesty and enlistment. Wang Wang-ju, a minor feudal official in the early Ch'ing, expressed particular satisfaction with Chin Sheng-t'an's use of Lu Chün-i's nightmare to bring his 70-chapter version to a close. He recognized this as "contributing in

no small measure to the sages" because it "made robbers and thieves shudder."* Yü Wan-ch'un, who lived during the reign of Ch'ing Emperor Tao-kuang, also addressed Chin as "Mr. Sheng-t'an" and bitterly denounced the 100-chapter and 120-chapter editions as "false books." He praised the 70-chapter version as being truly "Water Margin before (Shih) Nai-an."** He asserted that "those who are loyal and have a sense of justice will not become robbers, and being robbers they can in no way be regarded as loyal and just."** He wrote T'ang Kou Chih /Record of Extermination of Bandits/ to form a link with the 70-chapter version. In this work he allowed the descendants of Chuchiachuang to kill all the 108 Liangshan generals to prove that "in those days Sung Chiang neither accepted the offer of amnesty and enlistment nor set out to fight Fang La."** Both Wang and Yü failed to understand the real motive of Water Margin to use Sung Chiang to preach the idea of capitulationism. They likewise did not perceive, or were reluctant to observe, that Sung Chiang and other capitulationists who mingled with the peasant army were of the same category of people like themselves. They were of the opinion that only by exterminating all peasant insurgents could the revolutionary people be awed and "shudder" and dare not revolt. These people were in fact quite muddle-headed for the revolutionary peasants could in no way be exterminated. The wanton slaughter resorted to by the reactionary rulers would only arouse the revolutionary peasants to resist more fiercely. As Lu Hsün rightly said: "As long as stones are there, fire will not be extinguished." ("Subject Unfixed," draft, Ch'iehchieh-t'ing Miscellaneous Essays, Part II)

But there were more muddle-headed people, one of whom was Kuei Chuang of the early Ch'ing. He was categorical in identifying Water Margin as a "book that instigates sedition."*** Chin Sheng-t'an's mutilation and his commentaries on Water Margin, Kuei asserted, had the effect of elevating the book and enabled it to "mislead people, impair the prevailing customs and upset the pursuit of learning, apart from a host of unpardonable crimes."*** In Kuei Chuang's pedantic mind, with the exception of feudal Confucian classics and stereotyped writings, works like Water Margin and what not should be summarily burned. Whereas Chin disavowed Sung Chiang but affirmed Water Margin, Kuei negated both Sung and Water Margin, including Chin. This phenomenon in history is worth looking into. In the confrontation between the peasantry and the landlord class, the revolutionary peasants unfurled the red flag, while the feudal ruling class hoisted the white flag, the distinction being so clear

---

* Commentaries on a Book About Five Scholars, Vol. 1, "Mr. Wang Wang-ju's General Comment on Water Margin," p. 1.

** Yü Ch'ung-hua: Tang K'ou-chih, Commercial Press edition, Vol. 1, p. 1.

*** Kuei Chung: "More on Kuei Yüan-kung," appendage "Exterminating Evils."

as to allow no confusion. However, capitulationists like Sung Chiang unfurled a flag of assorted colors, a mixture of red and white, which alternately served as its basic color. Both Li K'uei and Wu Yung of Water Margin failed to see the white at the base of the red color and so wrongly recognized this flag. As a result, Sung Chiang succeeded in ruining Liangshan's revolutionary cause by using a false red flag -- under the guise of "carrying out the wish of Heaven" -- to substitute for Ch'ao Kai's revolutionary red flag. Chin Sheng-t'an and his supporters only saw a red coating on the white and thus also wrongly recognized this flag. Therefore, Chin chopped the final minor half of Water Margin and used slaughter as the ending to intimidate people not to raise the red flag any more. In the opinion of Kuei Chuang and people like him, any work that was tainted with red, regardless of whether the red color was true or false, should be burned and destroyed so as to prevent people recalling the red flag. He maintained that Chin's mutilation of Water Margin was superfluous and considered disavowing the existence of the red flag as the best counter-revolutionary measure, this being similar to the ostrich-like approach. From the Water Margin author to Chin Sheng-t'an to Kuei Chuang, despite their identification with the same landlord class standpoint, it is clear that one became more reactionary, self-revealing and muddle-headed than the other.

Those who heaped praises on Chin's mutilation of Water Margin were not all muddle-headed, since some perceived the subtleties of the original edition. The Japanese bourgeois scholar Yen-ku-wen /U. Shioya 盐谷温/ spoke approvingly of Chin's mutilation of Water Margin. He said, "The first tersely written half has been retained" so as "to produce an endless flow of lofty air for Water Margin."* He deserved to be called Chin's admirer abroad. But a closer check reveals that something was wrong. Chin was against Sung Chiang while Yen-ku-wen affirmed him. This was indeed a very big difference. What Yen-ku-wen affirmed was Chin's mutilation of Water Margin but he did not approve of the motive behind the mutilation. Unlike Chin, he was completely able to appreciate Water Margin's painstaking effort to preach the idea of capitulationism through the character Sung Chiang. However, he considered the depiction in the 100-chapter and 120-chapter editions of the whole course of events leading to Sung Chiang's capitulation as being too revealing. But after Chin's chopping, Sung Chiang became a peasant hero who perished for a noble cause in the episode on "a dreadful dream that frightens the Liangshan heroes." This "extraordinarily subtle and elusive approach charged with emotions" so impressed Yen-ku-wen that he "could not help banging the table and exclaiming words of approval."* It is true that this chopping produced in an objective sense a social impact not previously thought of by Chin himself in his subjective thinking. Subjectively, he thought of deprecating Sung

---

* Yen-ku-wen, Talks on the Concepts of Chinese Literature, K'aiming Bookstore, 1929 Chinese translation edition, p. 417.

Chiang but objectively he elevated Sung. While subjectively he misunderstood Water Margin's real intention, objectively he promoted the book's real motive. He prevented Sung from accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment in order to strip Water Margin of its protective coloration, true white and false red. However, the result is that objectively he further covered up Water Margin's capitulationist essence and the true features of capitulationists like Sung Chiang, thus enabling them to practice greater deceit. In this way, muddle-headed Chin Sheng-t'an did for reactionary rule something that was far from muddled. Since Yen-ku-wen clearly observed this, he could not help "banging the table and exclaiming his approval." Beyond this, Yen-ku-wen said nothing. However, when Chiang Kai-shek later carried out extensive anti-communist and capitulationist activities during the War of Resistance against Japan, a Japanese imperialist element said something Yen-ku-wen did not utter. He did his utmost to praise Water Margin as an "incomparably fine material for the study of the Chinese nation."* What he meant was that the material preached capitulation. He declared: "The position of Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking today is quite similar to Sung Chiang's position and mood in the final stage of Liangshan Mountain."** Look, Water Margin was thus used by the Japanese imperialists as a "fine material" to lure the black sheep of the Chinese nation to surrender.

III

In Water Margin Sung Chiang is more crafty than Kao Ch'iu. In real life the Sung Chiangs are even more difficult to discern than the Kao Ch'ius. Those members of the landlord class in the Ch'ing Dynasty who were against Chin's mutilation of Water Margin supported Sung Chiang. As early as the reign of Ch'ien-lung, some people picked up the tail chopped by Chin and changed its name into Cheng Szu Kou /Suppressing the Four Brigands/ and published it in book form. These words were included: "Although at the outset the behavior was hardly commendable, later repentance and change of pace toward good conduct indeed deserved commendation and its merit could be enduring."*** In today's language, it means that rebellion should be condemned but surrender is to be commended. Another feudal man of letters named Ch'en Ch'en in the early Ch'ing period was against the 70-chapter version and endorsed the 100-chapter edition, expressing sympathy for Sung Chiang the capitulationist. However, he was not satisfied with the ending in which Sung Chiang was poisoned by Kao Ch'iu to death, an ending which he thought would dampen the ardor of the capitulationists. For this reason, he wrote A Sequel to Water Margin as a sequel to the 100-chapter edition. In this work,

---

* K. Izaka (井坂錦江), Water Margin and Chinese Nation, 1942 Japanese edition, p. 1.

** Ibid., the author's preface.

*** Lu Hsün, Outline History of Chinese Fiction, People's Literary Press, 1973 edition, p. 124.

Yen Ch'ing and Yang Lin sneaked into the camp to see Sung Hui Tsung at the risk of their lives. This so impressed the emperor that he immediately issued a citation to commend Sung Chiang as "a loyal and upright person who has achieved considerable meritorious services."* In addition, Li Chün and others were conferred titles by the new emperor Sung Kao Tsung and they lived like a king abroad, enjoying riches and honor and every luxury. This provided Water Margin with a bright tail. Whether the tail was picked up or added, the objective was to encourage people to emulate Sung Chiang the capitulationist and become a loyal subject. Using a pliant knife to cut off the head without giving a sense of death is how they were more crafty than the muddle-headed Chin Sheng-t'an.

Among those who were against Chin Sheng-t'an's mutilation of Water Margin, some were also duped. During the Revolution of 1911 some people who took the stand of the national bourgeoisie disavowed the 70-chapter version but affirmed the 100-chapter edition. These people spoke approvingly of Water Margin's "emphasis on civil rights and promotion of universal principles"** and criticized Chin's mutilation of the original edition as "a severe blow"** to Water Margin. They did so because they were misled into mistaking the Water Margin's thesis of "opposing only corrupt officials and not the emperor" for opposing "the autocratic government through several thousand years."*** They were likewise blind to the fact that the book had deep-seated class roots. Since the Chinese national bourgeoisie had countless ties with imperialism and the feudal classes, they were born vulnerable and thus displayed the tendency to compromise and waver. They tended to forgive others so they could forgive themselves. By forgiving Sung Chiang's appeasement and vacillation, the Chinese national bourgeoisie could forgive these tendencies in themselves. Their dual character -- the possibility of participating in the revolution and of compromising with the enemies of the revolution -- determined their opposition to Kao Ch'iu and sympathy for Sung Chiang. They could discern counter-revolutionary diehards like Chin Sheng-t'an but not those capitulationists like Sung Chiang who hid in the revolutionary ranks. This trait illustrates that it was impossible for the Chinese national bourgeoisie to carry the Chinese revolution through to the end, and that even as an ally of the revolution they were extremely unreliable as they were susceptible to compromise and vacillation.

---

* Ch'en Ch'en, Sequal to Water Margin, Shanghai Classical Literary Press, 1956 edition, p. 214.

** Yen-nan Shang-sheng: New Commentaries on Water Margin, distributed by Government Printers.

*** Man: "Random Talks About Novels," see Historical Material on Chinese Fiction, Classical Literary Press, 1957 edition, pp. 37-38.

In this historical debate on Chin Sheng-t'an's mutilation of Water Margin, Hu Shih, a comprador man of letters, was by far the most crafty among all categories of people. This craftiness stems from his recognition of the usefulness of both Sung Chiang and Chin Sheng-t'an to reactionary rule. Therefore, he was fond of both. His fondness of Chin was derived from his admiration for Chin's firm counter-revolutionary stand. But he was fond of Sung Chiang much more because he needed the Sung Chiangs to join him in helping imperialism and its lackeys "conquer the minds of the Chinese nation."* Therefore, he was impressed by the inflexible stand taken by Chin in his commentaries on Water Margin and praised Chin for his display of "rare insight and extraordinary courage."** However, he was against Chin's hostility toward Sung Chiang such as his "interpretation of Shih Nai-an's compliments for Sung Chiang as bitter abuse."** He also condemned Chin for being "trite" and "destestable."*** Hu Shih denounced Chin with mixed feelings of tempering abuse with praise and intermixing grudge with pity. He seemed to convey the setbacks he had encountered in his political career and reflect the common anguish of capitulationists. As the leader of the New Moon clique, Hu Shih was then running errands for the Kuomintang reactionaries, who, however, misunderstood his different strategy for dealing with the revolutionaries. Although he was spared the fate of decapitation which befell Chin, he was truly frightened. He subsequently defended himself by writing in the New Moon journal an article based on the Three People's Principles. As a result, he was kept as a professor. This setback caused Hu to bear a grudge against Chin for the latter's "misunderstanding the intention of Water Margin"*** and having Sung Chiang who belonged to the same camp killed. Hu, however, pitied Chin's death at the hands of the feudal Ch'ing court due to a misunderstanding despite his loyalty to the Ch'ing administration. Hu naturally had sympathy for himself and was grieved at being misunderstood by his reactionary masters. All capitulationists possess protective coloration. While this may prove more deceptive to the revolutionary people, very often it also arouses the misunderstanding of one's confederates in the same reactionary camp and leads to one's being executed. How unjust! Sung Chiang, who was devoted to counter-revolution, was misunderstood by Chin Sheng-t'an, a counter-revolutionary. Chin, who was loyal to the feudal court, was misunderstood by the feudal court, while Hu Shih and the New Moon clique that remained loyal to the Kuomintang reactionaries were likewise misunderstood by the Kuomintang reactionaries. This kind of merry-go-round in history reflected "some particularly amusing strife in the counter-revolutionary camp, a breach that was neither big nor small, a kind of itching and painful contradiction." ("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism")

---

* Lu Hsün: "On a Few Things in China," Ch'iehchieht'ing Miscellaneous Essays

** "Verification of Water Margin," A Collection of Articles by Hu Shih, Vol. 3.

*** Ibid.

IV

In this controversy that has lasted for more than 300 years representatives of different classes and diverse cliques have appeared to express divergent views on the case involving Chin Sheng-t'an's mutilation of Water Margin. The focal point of the dispute from beginning to end revolves around the precise approach to be taken toward the capitulationist Sung Chiang and to the idea of capitulationism preached in Water Margin. For a long time this debate has in the main persisted within the counter-revolutionary camp. Despite attempts to affirm Chin and negate Sung, disavow Sung and affirm Chin, negate both or affirm both, they are all aimed at suppressing the revolutionary people, the divergence existing only in ways to employ acceptable counter-revolutionary tactics.

Not until the participation of Lu Hsün, the main fighter in the Chinese cultural revolution, in the discussions toward the end of the 1920's was the controversy marked by a confrontation between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary groups. Lu Hsün published his article "The Evolution of Rascals" in 1929 and another article "About Chin Sheng-t'an" in 1933. In sharp contrast to Hu Shih's reactionary stand of cherishing both Chin and Sung, Lu's articles not only penetratingly condemned Chin's stubborn reactionary stand but also exposed Sung and other capitulationists for what they were. Lu Hsün incisively pointed out: "The book Water Margin makes it very clear: because they are not against the emperor, they accept the offer of amnesty and enlistment when massive government troops arrive and set out to fight other brigands -- brigands who do not 'carry out the wish of Heaven' for the state. They are lackeys after all." ("The Evolution of Rascals")

Lu Hsün criticized ancient reactionaries for the precise purpose of criticizing modern reactionaries -- Hu Shih and Hu Shih-type persons. In the counter-revolutionary camp, Sung Chiang and Kao Ch'iu, the Water Margin author and Chin Sheng-t'an, respectively represented two different categories of reactionaries. Of these two categories Lu Hsün leveled particularly severe criticism against the former and not the latter, that is, the capitulationists in the revolutionary camp and not the diehards in the counter-revolutionary camp. Chin's counter-revolutionary utterances and actions were open and undisguised so it was rather easy for the revolutionary people to discern them. More insidious to the revolution are capitulationists disguised as revolutionaries, who practice revisionism disguised as Marxism. These counter-revolutionaries hidden inside the revolutionary camp are more sinister, deceptive and crafty than those counter-revolutionaries who operate in the open. Precisely because of this, Lu Hsün time and again reminded the revolutionary people of the need to heighten their vigilance against this category of people.

Influenced by Liu Shao-ch'i's revisionist line after the founding of the new China, Water Margin and people like Sung Chiang continued to be eulogized. Prior to the great proletarian cultural revolution, profuse commentaries on Water Margin practically all ran counter to Lu Hsün's theses. They embellished and praised Sung Chiang's capitulationist line affirmed in

Water Margin. When the revisionist trend of thought spread unchecked at home and abroad in the early 1960's, the academic circles whipped up an evil wind of reversing the verdict on Chin Sheng-t'an. The revisionists delighted in the confusion that prevailed in understanding questions relating to Water Margin because this confusion contributed to their promotion of the revisionist line and their practice of surrender and regression. When the ancient capitulationists were arrogantly parading themselves in books, on the stage and the screen, people found it difficult to recognize the modern capitulationists.

This state of affairs, however, must not be permitted to continue.

Chairman Mao recently pointed out: "The merit of the book Water Margin lies precisely in the portrayal of capitulation. It serves as teaching material by negative example to help all people recognize capitulationists." He added: "Water Margin is against corrupt officials only, but not against the emperor. It excludes Ch'ao Kai from the 108 people. Sung Chiang pushes capitulationism, practices revisionism, changes Ch'ao's Chü-i T'ing to Chung-i T'ang, and accepts the offer of amnesty and enlistment. Sung Chiang's struggle against Kao Ch'iu is a struggle waged by one faction against another within the landlord class. As soon as he surrenders, Sung Chiang goes to fight Fang La." Chairman Mao's instructions have penetratingly revealed Water Margin's essence of preaching the capitulationist line, brought out the true features of Sung's practice of revisionism and capitulationism, and permitted Lu Hsün's theses on Water Margin to be further elucidated and raised to the plane of combating and preventing revisionism.

Chairman Mao has applied the tersely stated Marxist theses to settle the case concerning Water Margin. However, as long as class struggle, capitulationists, the capitulationist trend of thought and revisionism exist, there is a possibility that the verdict on Water Margin may still be reversed. Cases involving the reversal of correct verdicts have occurred in history, in China and elsehwere. Lenin and Stalin settled the case concerning the Soviet Union taking the road of the October Revolution. But this was reversed once Khrushchev came to power. Furthermore, he revised the history of the Soviet Communist Party so as to prepare public opinion in favor of his usurping both the Party and the government and restoring capitalism in an all-round manner. This struggle between the forces that decide cases and those seeking to reverse them will encompass the entire course of events in the historical stage of socialism. However, as long as the revolutionary people are armed with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought, unfold revolutionary mass criticism in a deep-going and sustained manner, and penetratingly recognize the harmful nature of capitulationists and the capitulationist trend of thought as well as their various manifestations, it will be difficult for revisionism to reverse verdicts on cases that have been decided. Therefore, we must conscientiously study and comprehend Chairman Mao's instructions and unfold criticism of and discussions on Water Margin. This is fraught with vital and far-reaching significance in relation to the efforts of our Party and the people of our country to uphold Marxism, combat revisionism and persist in carrying out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line now and in the future, in this century and the next.

* * *

Comment on Sung Chiang's "Going to the Mountain"

by

Shih Ch'uan (石川)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 10, October 14, 1975)

In any great revolutionary movement in history which swept forward like a surging tide, it was inevitable that the inferior and the superior mingled together as mud and sand are carried by the rolling waves. Sung Chiang of Water Margin was swept and carried forward like mud and sand by the surging tide of the peasant revolution. With his "body in the water margin and heart in the imperial court," he pushed a capitulationist line after having usurped the leadership of the Liangshan insurgent army. This manifested itself in his "going to the mountain" in hope of "seeking promotion in office."

Long before going to the "mountain," Sung Chiang's capitulationist line was identified with deep class and ideological roots. Clearly discerning the whole circumstances surrounding Sung Chiang's going to the "mountain" is fraught with meaning in understanding the inevtiable outcome and substance of his obsession with the capitulationist line. Although the Water Margin author traced the whole course of events that led to Sung Chiang's going to the "mountain" for the express purpose of embellishing Sung and with a view to preparing the reader for what was to follow, in this case about a "hero's ending" for Sung, using the method of class analysis will go a long way toward unraveling the truth behind Sung's going to the "mountain."

Chairman Mao points out: "The landlord class' brutal economic exploitation and political oppression of the peasantry forced the latter to rise in revolt on numerous occasions to resist the landlord class' domination." This is the universal law underlying peasant uprisings. The episode about "seizing the birthday presents by strategy" is a case in point. The reason why the Juan brothers went to Liangshan Mountain, "fearing neither Heaven, nor the earth, nor the officials" and keeping things in ferment is precisely that they had been mercilessly exploited economically and oppressed politically. "Whenever the officials act in those affairs," the Juan brothers recalled, "the people suffer for it. As soon as they come into the village they first seize the people's pigs, sheep, fowls and geese, and eat them, and then demand money to cover the traveling expenses of their soldiers." Thus economic exploitation was invariably backed by political oppression. The officials dared to run amuck in the villages because they had the backing of the state apparatus of the landlord class. Consequently, when the Juan brothers heard that Grand Secretary Liang was planning to dispatch birthday gifts worth over 100,000 strings of cash and other valuables to his father-in-law, they were determined to go to Liangshan Mountain to join the rebels. In response to the peasantry's revolutionary demands, Ch'ao Kai succeeded in obtaining the support of the poor and wretched peasants by abandoning the landlord class' "selfish notions" of class prejudice. When the uprising was under way, he pursued a correct line by "seizing the birthday

presents, killing and wounding large numbers of government troops, apart from capturing Huang An alive." This way of getting things done turned Liangshan Mountain into a "thriving place."

What kind of person was Sung Chiang? Why did he go to the "mountain"? He was born into a landlord class family and was originally a jailer in Yunch'eng county. Having no access to great power nor possessing great wealth, he earned the reputation of being a "fine calligrapher who was quite familiar with all the routine of public office," and as one who "squandered money as though it was dirt." Without bothering about the lure of money to people in public service, where did the "money" Sung Chiang "gave to charity" come from? Not to mention how he used this "money" to buy the reputation of being "charitable" and "never refusing to give money when people asked for it," at least he was not so economically hard pressed as the Juan brothers were. As an official, that is, a cog in the wheel of the state machine, he would be acquitted by the yamen and other officials who were friendly toward him even if he killed someone. In such a case he could make good his escape. In short, Sung Chiang went to the "mountain" not because he was mercilessly exploited economically and oppressed politically.

Sung Chiang went to the "mountain" directly because he killed Yen P'o-hsi /or Mrs. Yen/. Yen, a prostitute, gave her daughter to Sung out of gratitude for him, but this woman had an affair with Sung's roommate, Chang Wen-yuan, a jailer. When Sung discovered the adultery, he was snubbed by Yen, who also tried to blackmail him with a letter addressed to him by the Liangshan heroes. In a fit of rage Sung killed her with a chopper. It was said that Sung killed the woman out of a sense of "righteousness" and for his involvement in "secretly setting Heavenly King Ch'ao free." But this is merely the author's attempt to embellish Sung. If Sung were truly heroic by nature and had kept away from prostitutes, he would not have been involved in amorous affairs even if he had secretly freed ten Ch'ao Kais. Li K'uei was the one who unmasked Sung when he said: "You are by nature fond of wine and women. The slaying of Yen exemplified in a modest way your maintenance of Li Shih-shih in the Eastern Capital."

Since Sung was the "benefactor" of Liangshan heroes who were opposed to the "great Sung emperor," he should logically and of his own accord go to Liangshan to keep away from the officials. Yet he did not go to the "mountain" on that account. He had arranged three places of safety for himself, namely: "Small Whirlwind" Chai Chin's farmstead in Henghai prefecture, Tsangchou, "Little Li Kuang" Hua Jung's place in Ch'ingfeng barracks, Ch'ingchou, and K'ung Tai-kung's manor at Paihu Mountain. All three were either scions of powerful and wealthy families or ranking officials and powerful landlords, being implacable enemies of the peasantry. Instead of joining the peasant insurgent force, Sung turned to these people because of his close affinity with this category of persons. This is illustrative of the class character of the landlord class. Turning to people like Chai Chin was of course ultimately aimed at waiting for the "bountiful granting of grand amnesty so father and son could see each other again and look forward to a "peaceful and happy life." This waiting for "grand amnesty" was related to Sung's waiting for the offer of "amnesty and enlistment" after he went to the "mountain," the difference being in degree and not in principle. As water has its source

and trees their roots, the traces of the ideological source of Sung's capitulationist line may be found here.

Trust in the landlord class and deprecation of the peasant insurgent force originally constituted the two sides of the same standpoint. At first Sung strongly disapproved of the idea of Ch'ao Kai joining the brigands and making things hum." He considered that as inviting "extinction of one's family" and steered clear of the idea of ever joining the brigands. When he later learned that Wu Sung was planning to go to the Two Dragon Mountain, he counseled the latter with this advice: "If the imperial court offers us amnesty and enlistment you can then induce Lu Chih-shen and Yang Chih to surrender. If in the future we are assigned to the frontier and defend the empire with swords, we may win honors for our wives and security for our sons. Our names will later on be emblazoned in history and then we would not have lived in vain." These words in a nutshell reveal that first, Sung was opposed to Ch'ao Kai's joining the brigands and doing things in a big way, such as defeating government troops and killing the officials -- "unpardonable under the laws of the land"; and second, he did not object to Wu Sung's joining the brigands because he not only wanted Wu and others to wait for "the court's offer of amnesty and enlistment" but expected Wu to "induce" others to surrender to the court. In Sung's view, Wu was brave and could definitely become a high official through "killing people and setting houses on fire and then accepting the offer of amnesty and enlistment" -- an approach that would appear particularly suitable for Wu. These words can be interpreted as underlying the "general program" for Sung's later actions, for they serve as his elaborately conceived goal after he went to the "mountain" -- a counter-revolutionary self-confession of the capitulationist line he espoused. After assuming command of the Liangshan insurgent force, didn't he issue a surrender proclamation "imploring the Heavenly King to grant us amnesty at an earlier date so as to keep us satisfied," and didn't he repeatedly expect "the court's amnesty and enlistment offer"? He was not only obsessed with the idea of surrendering himself but devised every means, soft or tough, to induce the entire Liangshan insurgent army to capitulate to the court. He not only set out to put down the insurgent force led by Fang La, but indirectly put to death his Liangshan brothers. Didn't he assume office as "Pacification Commander of Chuchou" on the bodies and bones of the peasantry just to "win honor for his wife and security for his sons"? Why did Sung not join the brigands at the same time as Wu Sung? If he had no intention to go to Liangshan, he might go to Two Dragon Mountain. He admitted: "I have no ability, and although I am loyal, there is no hope of promotion for me." This admission of futility and lack of ability vividly illustrates the despicable and contradictory frame of mind of a faithful lackey of the feudal ruling class: having neither the access to becoming a high official nor hopes of gaining advancement.

During this period Sung Chiang did not altogether lack the chance to go to the "mountain." Having caused trouble at Hua Jung's Ch'ingfeng barracks, he thought of going to Liangshan on "the impulse of the moment," that is, without having the conscious need to go to the "mountain" but merely acting on the "impulse" of "following the mainstream." This feeling failed to pass the test. As things turned up later, a letter from home made him abandon his brothers and hurry to his landlord's manor. He never forgot "loyalty" and "filial piety." His father's admonition on being "disloyal and unfilial"

awakened him to the undesirability of going to Liangshan "on the impulse of the moment" and hardened his resolve to become a faithful lackey of the landlord class. In the moral concept of the landlord class, remaining "loyal" to the emperor and being "filial" to one's father were in complete accord -- "loyalty" having "filial piety" as the basis and "filial piety" having "loyalty" as the prerequisite. As an utterly loyal subject of the great Sung emperor, it would be unthinkable for Sung to go to the "mountain" and join the brigands, acting like Ch'ao Kai and others who were "hostile to the great Sung emperor." The deep-seated doctrines of Confucius and Mencius formed the very class and ideological roots of his capitulation at a later stage. Since then he even regarded "going to the mountain" as "going against the wish of Heaven and my father's admonition." When he was framed, he would face the charge and be banished to Chiangchou rather than "go into hiding and take to wandering about everywhere to be caught with a group of brothers given to killing and arson." He also asserted he would take his own life rather than "go to the mountain." He would not even "remove the chains" when he was urged to do so and said he would not dare "touch the laws of the state." This revealed the ugly features of a typical lackey in the service of the feudal ruling class.

But Sung after all did "go to the mountain." This occurred after he wrote a "seditious poem" on the wall of Hsunyang Inn. Did he really want to emulate Huang Ch'ao and rebel against the feudal rulers? Not at all. What he referred to as "fantastic words I wrote when I was drunk" is hardly believable, for his "fantastic words" could have come only from his suppressed grievances. From childhood he studied Confucian classics and when he grew up he learned to master a series of tactics for dealing with people. He spoke with apparent pride when he mentioned these things. However, he lamented: "I am over 30 without having achieved anything in fame or merit. Instead, I have been branded on my cheeks and have a feeling of remorse." Thus he wrote a poem on the wall "as a record" of his "later rise to eminence." If Huang Wen-ping /who arrested Sung/ were a sensible person, he might as well not have bothered about the incident. As long as the ruling clique gave him a little of the leftovers from the table Sung would naturally feel grateful and seek to return the favors bestowed on him. The reason why Huang Wen-ping seized on this is that he wanted to please people like Ts'ai Ching and Kao Ch'iu, in what was a "one faction fight against another within the landlord class," a particularly amusing dogfight within the ruling class. It is exactly this kind of factional fight within the landlord class that "drove" Sung to Liangshan Mountain. After killing Huang Wen-ping, Sung said he had to go to Liangshan because he killed an official. In these circumstances he had nowhere to turn to except following Wu Sung's footsteps by going to the "mountain" to "seek temporary refuge in the water margin," and waiting for an opportunity to surrender to the court. He was like "a fierce tiger lying in the wilderness, its claws and fangs retracted as a gesture of tolerance." In this sense, Sung Chiang should be grateful to Kao Ch'iu and people like him, for without their "pushing" him, when would he have a chance to achieve fame and fortune and "rise to higher official posts"?

This is the whole course of events that led to Sung's "going to the mountain," the same circumstances that led to his surrender. Sung's landlord family origin, his feudal upbringing, the influence of the doctrines of

Confucius and Mencius, and the twists and turns that marked his "going to the mountain" illustrate that the capitulationist line he pursued did not appear all of a sudden after the death of Ch'ao Kai but had its deep-seated class and ideological roots. We must pay attention to the sections and chapters in the first half of Water Margin to appreciate the author's wish. Of course, he wrote Water Margin in such a way as to embellish and extol Sung Chiang, but this provides us with excellent material by negative example in our criticism of capitulationism.

As a rare teacher by negative example, Sung's "going to the mountain" tells us that in judging a person and examining a line we must make class analysis in historical perspective. This is true of our approach to Sung Chiang. It is also true in dealing with the Lin Piao anti-Party clique. We must "excel in recognizing those elements who pretend to support but actually oppose the revolution and remove them from our various fronts. This is to safeguard the great victories we have already won and will win in the future," in this way carrying to completion the struggle in the realm of the superstructure to have the proletariat defeat the bourgeoisie and Marxism defeat revisionism.

* * *

Tsarist Russia's Tool of Aggression Against China -- the Mission of the Russian Orthodox Church

by

Fang Hsiu (方 秀)

(Li-shih Yen-chiu /Historical Research/, No. 3, June 20, 1975)

What the Russian Church Mission in Peking did from the early 18th century to the early 20th century constitutes a sinister chapter in the history of Tsarist Russia's aggression against China, memories of which are fresh even to this day in the minds of the Chinese people who suffered greatly in its hands.

As early as the middle of the 19th century, Marx, the great revolutionary teacher of the proletariat exposed the official background and aggressive nature of the Russian church, pointing out that the Russian "church has become an ordinary tool of the state, a tool of internal oppression and external plunder." ("The Greek Riots")

"The bourgeoisie has turned everything into a commodity, and the study of history is no exception. The nature of the bourgeoisie and the conditions of its existence are such that it has to forge all commodities and therefore also history." (Engels, "Fragments of 'Irish History'") In order to meet the requirements of social-imperialist policy, the Soviet revisionists have long degenerated into forgers of history confusing right and wrong and black and white. Some of them describe the notorious Russian Church Mission in Peking as a religious and academic body, so as to cover up the scandals and unsavory records of their "forefathers" in the history of Sino-Russian relations, and so that a "dignified" diplomatic tradition may be fabricated for the discredited "ugly Russians" the world over. Others have claimed that "the activities of the great majority of Russian Church missionaries in Peking were filled with respect for China's national culture, and helped familiarize the Russian public with the economy, history, life and art of the Chinese people."* Under the pens of hired scholars of the Soviet revisionists, the Russian Church Mission in Peking, which was in every sense a tool of aggression, has been glorified as a bridge of Sino-Russian friendship. Such reversing of history should certainly have to be corrected, and only by doing so can the true features of history be retained and the ugly faces of those fabricators of history be revealed in broad daylight.

---

* Tikhvinskiy, Modern History of China (1972 edition). Bunakov (布 纳 科 夫), "Russo-Chinese Relations in the Early 19th Century," Soviet Eastern Studies, 1956, No. 2, p. 104

A Handful of People Who Pushed a Predatory Policy Under the Cloak of Preaching the Word of God

By the latter period of the 16th century, Tsarist Russia crossed the Urals and expanded toward Siberia. In the middle of the 17th century, a handful of Tsarist Russian colonialists hopped from Siberia into the Heilung River valley, and their extreme ferocious acts made "Russia" a sanguinary word. During the "eastward advance" of the Tsarist Russian colonialists, the Eastern Orthodox Church played the important role of the cat's paw. In the 17th century, when the Tsarist Russian colonialists were building military bases in the Ob, Yenisei and Lena River valleys to make way for further expansion, monasteries of the Orthodox Church were also built. In order to have laborers attached to the grounds of the monastery so that the colonial occupation of the territory might be consolidated economically, the Russian preachers went as far as to offer captured Yakut and Mongolian women to Russian "vagabonds" as wives, on condition that they signed "contracts" enslaving themselves to the monastery.*

As early as before the Nipuchu (Nerchinsk) Treaty was signed, there were already activities of the Orthodox Church in Peking. Almost a hundred Russians, prisoners-of-war captured after they broke into the Heilung River valley before the signing of the Nipuchu Treaty, were living in the Russian military quarters in Peking. Among them was a preacher of the Orthodox Church. Emperor K'ang Hsi allowed these Russians to keep their own religious beliefs and for that purpose built a church in the district where they resided (Huchia-ch'uan alley inside Tungchihmen Gate). The inhabitants of Peking at that time called the church "Russian temple" and later Russian "North Hall."

During the reign of Peter I (1682-1725), the Tsarist Russian government began to use the Orthodox Church as a tool of aggression against China. In 1700 (the 39th year of K'ang Hsi), Peter I issued the Cardinal of Kiev, Varlam Yashinskiy (瓦尔拉姆·雅申斯基), a personal directive urging him to select with the utmost care from among his capable paws of the church, "the noble and pure both in words and in deeds," to direct church affairs at Tobolsk, the administrative and religious center of Tsarist Russia in Siberia. "May my son with the grace of God gradually bring those ignorant and stray souls of China and

---

* Badrai (巴德雷), Russia, Mongolia, China, 1919 English edition, London, Vol. I, pp. 136-137. Alexandrov (阿力山大罗夫), Russian Inhabitants in Siberia in the 17th and Early 18th Centuries, 1964 Russian edition, Moscow, pp. 132-133.

Siberia over to the side of the genuine lord."* Engels pointed out that Peter I was an "emperor of foresight who instructed his successors with all kinds of aggressive principles." ("Russia's Advance into Central Asia") And in order to realize these aggressive policies of the Tsar's, the Russian Church moved in many directions. Every time a Russian caravan came to China, it was always accompanied by a few church fathers to build up the relationship with the "Russian temple." For instance, in 1703, the caravan led by Ivan Savachiev (伊凡·萨瓦齐耶夫) had nine missionaries.** These exploratory activities prepared the experience and people for the formal despatch of a Russian Church Mission to China.

In 1712 (the 51st year of K'ang Hsi), the commissioner of the Russian caravan asked permission to send Tsarist Russian preachers to Peking to take over from the one who was getting old. The request was granted by the Ch'ing government. In 1715 (the 54th year of K'ang Hsi), Tsarist Russia despatched from Tobolsk a batch of "barbarian monk preachers" to Peking, accompanied by the secretary general of the cabinet of the Ch'ing court, T'u-li-ch'en(图理琛).+ The Russian Church Mission, consisting of ten members, included the head of the monastery Ilalyon (伊拉里翁), Father Laplanch (拉南伦齐), Church Executive Philimon (菲力蒙), and seven other church members.++ They stationed themselves in the Russian North Hall inside Tungchihmen Gate, and formally set up their base of operations. Because the Russian Church Mission was the only liaison channel for Russia in China at that time, the Tsarist Russian government took pains to see to it that both its activities and political influence were expanded. In 1725 (the 3rd year of Yung Cheng), the Russian Foreign Ministry issued secret instructions to their minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary Sava Uladislavich (萨瓦·务拉的思拉维赤), who arrived in Peking to negotiate border problems, urging him to do his best to get the Ch'ing court to allow members of the Russian Church Mission "not only to be able to live in Peking to conduct mass in church according to the rituals of the Orthodox Church, but also to be able to visit without any restrictions all their faithfuls in other places under the

---

* Soloviyev (索洛维约夫), 29-Volume Russian History, Part 8 (comprising volumes 15-16), 1962 Russian edition, Moscow, p. 95.

** "Palace Museum Russian Historical Records (Original Files of Notes and Documents from Russia During the Reign of K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung of the Ch'ing Dynasty)," pp. 279-280, 1936 edition.

\+ T'u-li-ch'en, Records of Foreign Lands.

++ Bandesh -- Kaminskiy(班蒂什一卡敏斯基), Collection of Russian-Chinese Diplomatic Documents, 1616-1792, 1882 Russian edition, Kazan, pp. 80-81.

rule of Bokdakhan (the Chinese Emperor).* The motive was very clear. It wanted to have its tentacles of aggression stretched to everywhere. In 1727 (the 5th year of Yung Cheng), by signing the "Sino-Russian Kikhta Border Treaty," the Tsarist Russian government had the Russian Church Mission transformed from a provisional organization into a permanent one, whose staff would be changed every ten years. According to the treaty clauses, a Orthodox Church was built west of the Yüho Bridge and was known as "South Hall." From then onward, there were two Orthodox Churches in Peking.** In this way, an official link was forged between the Russian Senat (Privy Council) and the Ministry of Tribal Affairs of the Ch'ing Dynasty. Through the church, Tsarist Russia was gradually able to establish in China its headquarters for conducting conspiratory activities.

The Russian Church Mission in Peking consisted of a handful of "people who pushed a predatory policy under the cloak of preaching the word of God." (Lenin, "China's War") It had its unique features in organizational structure, subordinate relationship and financial sources. First, the secular in the Russian Church Mission greatly outnumbered the clergy. Usually, each group consisted of 9 to 12 members, but there were only 3-4 official members including the group leader, the chief priest (referred to as "Dai Lama" in official Ch'ing documents), the priests and fathers; the rest being members of the entourage, most of them were students sent to China to study the Han and Manchu languages. These so-called "Russian school-boys" were young people between the ages of 18 and 22, and constituted a reserve to the anti-China backbone force in the Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry.+ Second, the Russian Church Mission was under the control of the Tsarist Russian Foreign Ministry. When the mission was changed, the Asian Department would appoint a supervisory officer (in most cases a military officer with the rank of colonel) with the responsibility of accompanying the new mission to China and escort the old group back to Russia.++ Third, the Russian Church Mission received a subsidy of 16,250 rubles a year

---

* Bandesh -- Kaminskiy(班蒂什—卡敏斯基), Collection of Russian-Chinese Diplomatic Documents, 1616-1792, 1882 Russian edition, Kazan, p. 454.

** With the signing of the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking" in 1860, Tsarist Russia set up its diplomatic mission on East Legation Lane, occupying the premises of South Hall. Therefore, South Hall was moved to North Hall, and the two churches were combined into one.

\+ Gorbacheva (戈尔巴切娃), "A Brief History of Russia's China Studies," Soviet Eastern Studies, 1955 No. 2, p. 142.

++ Dajeon (德吉昂), Outline History of Russian-Sino Religious, Political and Commercial Relations, 1873 English edition, Peking, p. 2[illegible]

from the Tsarist government, apart from receiving financial assistance from Russian businessmen operating in Kikhta, Changchiakow, Hankow and Tientsin."* Facts disclosed that the so-called "barbarian monk preachers" were but a flock of rapacious underlings fed and used by the Tsarist government to invade China. The praises lavished on it by the Soviet revisionists precisely shows that the Russian Church Mission "threw itself at the feet of the Tsarist government." (Engels, "Foreign Policy of the Russian Tsarist Government")

The history of the Russian Church Mission which lasted two hundred years (1715-1917) could be divided into two periods, with the signing of the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking" in 1860 (the 10th year of Hsien Feng) as the dividing line. Before that, the official organ set up in China by the Tsarist government operated as a "church," but actually it was a center of political, economic and cultural aggression against China. After that, the diplomatic authority of the Russian Church Mission was transferred to the Russian legation, while it itself was put under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and continued to undertake political activities in a more covert fashion to continue to serve the Tsar's policy of aggression against China. The former period, making up three quarters of the history of the Russian Church Mission, provided the Tsarist Russia's criminal cause of aggression against China with experience, channels and a trained backbone force. As the Tsar's tool of aggression against China, the Russian Church Mission made a great show of itself in this period. It is this article's purpose, therefore, to reveal primarily its crimes of aggression against China in its former period of existence.

From its establishment in 1715 to its reorganization in 1860, the Russian Church Mission in Peking was changed 13 times, involving a total turnover of 155 persons.** This figure constituted only one-third of the total number of Jesuit preachers (476) in China from 1583 to 1773. Although they were small in number, their reactionary potential was fairly great. Westerners had long before noted the political nature of the Peking Church Mission and still referred to it as the "religious and diplomatic mission"*** up to mid-19th century. Even the Tsarist Russian Chief of Staff Babukov (巴布科夫) of the West Siberian Command, lauding the Russian Church Mission, admitted: "The establishment of this Church Mission was an important measure for our country's

---

* Dajeon,(德吉昂), Outline History of Russian-Sino Religious, Political and Commercial Relations, 1873 English edition, Peking, p. 36.

** Enosen (英诺森), "The Russian Orthodox Church in China," Religious Affairs Journal, 1916 No. 10, p. 580.

*** Dajeon, op. cit., p. 36. Guston Karen (葛斯顿·加恩), History of Early Sino-Russian Relations, Chinese translation, 1961 edition, p. 144.

diplomatic policy toward China. Our Church Mission was a training school for those who later became renowned in the academic world or achieved fame because of their merit." He added: "Our government could obtain from this source the most accurate and latest information about China."* Obviously, the Russian Church Mission in Peking was not only the training school for hardcore aggressors against China, but also an intelligence outpost of the Tsarist government. Both these reactionary functions were glaringly revealed in the political life of a group of so-called "China hands."

"China Hands" and the Russian Foreign Ministry

Commenting on the Tsarist government's foreign policy, Engels sharply exposed the ugly features of those political adventurers in the Russian diplomatic circles. He pointed out: "This gang of people would do as much harm as their ability would permit." ("The Foreign Policy of the Russian Tsarist Government") This profound assertion equally applies to the Russian Church Mission in Peking.

When they first came to China, members of the Russian Church Mission began such illegal activities as espionage and stealing state secrets. Therefore, when the third group of the Church Mission (1736-1745) took over, the official historian of the Ch'ing Dynasty overseeing the Russian Hall, Ho Ch'ing (赫庆) in a memorial submitted in 1737 (the 2nd year of Ch'ien Lung) advocated that Tsarist Russian "schoolboys (referring to students accompanying the Church Mission) in Peking should not be allowed to move about freely in order to prevent them from knowing about the interior. They should not be sold maps, books and other prohibited articles."** But still this gang continued to display their "ability." In 1756 (the 21st year of Ch'ien Lung), the leader of the Russian caravan, Aleksai Vladikin (阿历克塞·弗拉迪金 originally a student member of the second group, staying in Peking from 1731 to 1746) collaborated with members of the Church Mission in Peking and, at the high price of 1,500 rubles, illegally duplicated a set of maps of the provinces and the capital of the Ch'ing Dynasty, and handed it over to the Russian Privy Council for secret study.*** Even Yakinpu Biyurin (雅金甫·俾丘林), praised as "father of Han studies in Russia," also had involved himself in such dirty work while he was Dai Lama of the 9th group (1809-1820). He often changed his priestly robes

---

* Babukov, Memoirs of My Service in West Siberia, 1912 Russian edition, Petersburg, pp. 127-128.

** Northern Memorandum, Vol. 12, "Survey of the Russian Hall."

*** Soloviyev, op. cit., Part 12 (23-24 volumes), 1964 Russian edition, Moscow, p. 390. Bandesh -- Kaminskiy, op. cit., pp. 217, 258.

into Chinese costume, toured the market place and walked the lanes. From his memory, he produced a "map of Peking City" in 1817. When he departed Peking to return to Russia, the books and manuscripts he took with him weighed 14,000 pounds, carried by 15 camels. Much of what he took away was "maps, books and other prohibited articles" which Ho Ch'ing warned against leaving the country.*

With the ending of the Napoleonic War in 1812, colonial infiltration by the Russian Church Mission entered a new stage in scale and depth. The Tsar Alexander I and his successor Nicholas I both wanted to dominate the world, their hands stretching further out to the east, and attempted to seize more territory and rights from China. In order to meet the needs of large-scale aggression against China, the Tsarist government on August 4, 1818 (the 23rd year of Chia Ch'ing) issued a new instruction to the Russian Church Mission in Peking, which said that its "chief task from now on is not to carry out religious activities but to undertake a general study of the Chinese economy and culture, and to promptly report to the Russian Foreign Ministry on any important event in Chinese political life."** The Russian Ministry of Religious Affairs on February 14, 1823 (the 3rd year of Tao Kuang) also instructed the Church Mission in Peking to urge its clergy to devote themselves to the task of collecting information on "Chinese rural economy and family life."+ In order to realize these designs, the following measures were taken: First, the Tsarist Russian government allocated funds to the Church Mission for the purchase of more books, medical equipment and scientific instruments and for building a library and an observatory. Second, outstanding students were selected from universities and parish middle schools to join the mission, while more doctors (including army doctors) and artists (draftsmen) were sent to Peking.++ Third, a council was set up by the Church Mission to look after work and financial problems. Accordingly, all aspects of the Mission were strengthened, from material equipment to personnel to organizational management. Therefore, the Church Mission in Peking in mid-19th century, during the course of Tsarist Russia's aggression against China, was training for the Russian Foreign Ministry batch after batch of "China hands" at an even greater pace.

---

* Gorbacheva, op. cit., pp. 141-142. Dajeon, op. cit., p. 35.

** Bunakov, op. cit., p. 101.

\+ Ibid., pp. 101-102.

++ P.Y. Skachkov (帕·叶·斯卡奇科夫), "Doctors of the Russian Church Mission in Peking," Soviet Chinese Studies, 1958 No. 4, pp. 136-148.

The 12th group that came into China (1840-1850) on the eve of the Opium War and the 13th group that followed (1850-1859) were, in the history of the Russian Church Mission, famous for producing an abundance of "China hands." Among the members belonging to these two groups were quite a number who directly took part in the anti-China activities carried out by the Russian Ambassador Ignachev (伊格纳切夫) from 1859 to 1860. For instance, before Ignachev's arrival in Peking, a member of the Mission of the Tsarist Russian Orthodox Church in Peking, Perovskiy (彼罗夫斯基) was promoted by the Tsarist government to be representative plenipotentiary, and it was he who put to the Ch'ing government the unreasonable demand of having Chinese territory east of the Wusuli ceded to Russia. Another Tsarist Russian Church Mission member, priest Kuli (古里), was ordered to stay in Peking to gather intelligence when Ignachev travelled down the south from Peking on May 28 to see what he could do to exploit the situation on the eve of the attack on Peking by British and French allied forces in 1860. They either provided maps or played the role of agents, fully revealing their jackal fangs.* Here it is not necessary to list all of them. Let's just dissect two notorious characters among them, namely Chakharov (札哈罗夫) and Skachkov (斯卡奇科夫). This pair of anti-China partners were reputed as "Han scholars," and both had served as consul-generals. This best illustrated the relationship between "China hands" and the Russian Foreign Ministry.

As a student-member of the 12th group, Chakharov studied at the Petersburg Seminary before coming to China. While he stayed in Peking, he concentrated on learning the Manchu language, and wrote such books as "A Manchu-Russian Dictionary" and "Manchu Grammar." After he was relieved, he was made a 5th-grade civil officer in the Russian Foreign Ministry, and was appointed consul-general to Ili from 1851 (the 1st year of Hsien Feng) to 1864 (the 3rd year of T'ung Chih). During his term of office, Chakharov performed two "big merits" for the Tsar's aggression against China: First, in 1858, The Russian trading post in Tach'eng /in Sinkiang/ was burned to the ground by local gold-diggers, an incident that was purely "the result of the Russians driving away the gold diggers and killing some of them."** Yet Chakharov applied pressure during the talks, practiced political blackmail, extorted a "compensation" of 300,000 rubles payable in the form of 5,500 boxes of Wu-i Tea.*** Second, in 1864, during the signing of the "Sino-Russian Agreement Determining the Northwest Border," Chakharov schemed from the very start to "alter part of the direction of the border to

---

* Buksgaifdon (布克斯盖夫登), Russia and China, the 1860 Treaty of Peking, 1902 Russian edition, Lushun, pp. 123-124, 203-204.

** "An Account of Preparations for Barbarian Affairs," 6th year of Hsien Feng.

*** Ibid., 8th year of Hsien Feng.

be determined with regard to the province of Ili and Lake Zaissan."* As "the Tsar's envoy plenipotentiary on border demarcation," he negotiated with the Ch'ing representatives directly in Manchu and arbitrarily interpreted the clauses regarding "permanent outposts" in the old treaty (the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking"). Later, he had several thousand troops stationed around Lake Zaissan, where they built houses and tilled the land, thus "occupying what had not yet been marked."** Consequently, under his scheming, Tsarist Russia was ceded the vast territory that lay east and south of Lake Balkash in western China. Such aggressive acts against China were long ago recorded in Chinese documents, which solemnly pointed to the crimes of Chakharov, describing him as "one who was extremely cunning, the mastermind behind plots."***

Chakharov's partner against China, Skachkov, was a student-member of the 13th group and was also a "capable hand" at collecting information in China. While at university, he underwent special training in astronomy and agriculture, and on graduation was made an assistant at an experimental farm in the north. When he came to China, he was already 28. For someone of his age, to master the Han language required special conditions. Therefore, Skachkov did not care paying a high salary of 5.8 ounces of silver a month (the normal rate was only 4 ounces) to a Chinese scholar who gave him morning lessons (lessons were usually given in the evenings). Apart from energetically studying the Han language, he was in charge of the observatory at the Russian Hall and stole great amounts of Chinese astronomical and meteorological data. In the year 1853 alone, he sent the director of the Russian Observatory Kupfair (库普费尔) a 231-page observation report.+ In the 1850's the movement of T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo was spreading like wildfire, and the Ch'ing Dynasty was crumbling. The astronomist Skachkov was more interested in "political storms" than ever, and he not only kept a diary of excerpts of battle reports carried in the "Ching Pao," but also sat in tea houses frequently to probe into the situation. He summed up such form of espionage as a counter-revolutionary experience: "The tea house is a live encyclopedia of Chinese street talk."++ During his stay in Peking, Skachkov many times went into the suburbs of Peking to gather information about local agriculture, the dyeing industry and the brick and tile industry, as well as social data related to land rents, population, and customs and habits. A glance at the catalogue of part of

---

* Babukov, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

** "An Account of Preparations for Barbarian Affairs," 2nd year of T'ung Chih.

*** Ibid.

\+ Peking in the Days of the Uprising of the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo (Skachkov's Peking Diary), 1958 Russian edition, Moscow, p. 17.

++ Ibid., p. 19.

his works shows how long the hands this "China hand" had. From "Chinese Naval Affairs" (1858) to "Country Games in Suburban Peking" (1858), from "The Destiny of Chinese Astronomy" (1874) to "Chinese Recipes" (1883), he wrote almost everything. A cultural falcon as capable as he was naturally given serious attention by the Russian Foreign Ministry. In 1857, when Skachkov returned to Russia to convalesce, he was appointed an eight-grade translation officer in the Asian Department. In 1859 (9th year of Hsien Feng), he was again sent to China as Russian consul at T'ach'eng. During the talks on the demarcation of the northwest border between China and Russia, the background material supplied by Skachkov was viewed as a "real asset"* by Babukov, the Russian delegate who signed the paper. In 1867 (6th year of Tung Chih), he was transferred to Tientsin to become consul-general and concurrently take charge of all related port affairs. Skachkov was in China for a total period of 24 years, during which he took a direct part in such criminal activities as the Tsarist Russian aggression against China's northwest frontier areas and the seizure of coastal trading rights. After he retired in 1879 (5th year of Kuang Hsu), he continued to offer his advice for shipping Chinese tea by sea.

The political careers of Chakharov and Skachkov provided an ugly picture of the "ugly Russians" of the 19th century. It was vividly shown that during the whole undertaking of Tsarist Russia in encroaching on China, members of the Russian Church Mission, though each had his own "ability," pursued a single objective: to plunder, carve up and enslave China. For cutting this "fat meat," they certainly had to cover up their hideous crimes by what they called benevolence and righteousness. Therefore, they too paid "homage" to the Confucian shop.

Trumpeters of Confucian Worship and Aggression Against China

The doctrines of Confucius and Mencius are an ideological weapon with which to maintain reactionary rule and a spiritual yoke imposed on the laboring people. For the Russian Church Mission that pledged itself to aggression against China, they were something badly needed. Therefore, they were bound to become "intimate brothers." (Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy")

Since they came to China in 1715, members of the Russian Church Mission made use of their stay in Peking to collect Confucian classics** and set about translating them. First, "The Great Learning" (1780) and

---

* Babukov, op. cit., p. 110.

** Gorbacheva, "Chinese Engraved and Printed Editions Collected by the Institute of Eastern Studies, Soviet Academy of Sciences," Section One, "History of Collections," Academic Collections of the Institute of Eastern Studies, 15th edition, 1958 Russian edition, pp. 310-326. Zanigon (扎涅根), "On the Collections of Chinese Books by Russian and Soviet Libraries," Cultural History of the world, 1958 No. 5, pp. 137-139.

"The Golden Mean" (1784) were translated into Russian by a student-member of the 3rd group of the Mission, Leonjev (列昂节夫), a graduate of the "Slav, Greek and Latin Institute" in Moscow. He came to China twice, in 1742 (7th year of Ch'ien Lung) and in 1762 (27th year of Ch'ien Lung), staying in Peking for as long as 20 years. After returning to Russia, he worked in the Foreign Ministry for several years, and came to be known as the leading figure of Confucian worshippers in Russia in the 18th century.*

By the turn of the 19th century, standing in the forefront of trumpeters of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius was Yakinpu Biyurin (雅金甫·俾丘林). During his term as Dailama with the 9th group, he translated all the "Four Books" into Russian.** This "China hand" knew that there was something of value in the Confucian shop. In 1829, Biyurin translated into Russian the "Three-Character Classic," which peddled the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, praising it as "the eycyclopedia of the 12th century." In 1839, he wrote "The Chinese Law of History Founded by Confucius" and published it in the "Son of the Fatherland" journal giving it the inviolable orthodoxy of "the style of writing of the Spring and Autumn Period" serving the needs of "restraining oneself and returning to propriety." In 1848, he published his China: State of the Country and Customs of the People in Petersburg. In it, he grossly distorted the historical traditions and social life in China.*** In the third part of the book "Education," Biyurin extolled the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius as "holy instructions," and asserted that "The Four Books embraced the purest concepts of morality and government." Why should a follower of the Orthodox Church go out of his way to worship the soul of Confucius? Because the Confucian plans of government and moral standards suited the ambitions of the Tsar in invading and subjugating China. Therefore, as China was just about to become a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, the most decadent of dogmas was draped in the robe making it "the purest concept," paving the way for the merger of the ideas of returning to the old and the ideas of slavery.

Under Biyurin's influence, a veteran of the 10th group of the Russian Church Mission, Kramskiy (克雷姆斯基) was even more daring in

---

* Bandesh -- Kaminskiy,op. cit., p. 324; Strainena (斯特莱尼娜), "At the Source of Russian China Studies and World China Studies -- Reviewing the 'General History of the Eight Manchu Banners' translated jointly by Rosukin (罗索金) and Leonjev," Soviet Study on Nationalities, 1950 No. 1, pp. 170-172.

** Chuguyevskiy (楚古耶夫斯基), "Manuscripts of Biyurin Kept in the Files of the Institute of Eastern Studies," Problems of Eastern Studies, 1959 No. 5, p. 138.

*** Bernstein (别恩什坦), "Biyurin and His Works," see Compilations of Historical Materials of Nationalities in Ancient Central Asia, Vol. I, 1950 Russian edition, Moscow, p. 5-24.

his utterances regarding Confucian worship and aggression against China. In the 1840's, he wrote "On the Confucian Doctrine" (published in 1906 by the Church Mission in Peking under the title "Explanatory Notes to the Confucian Doctrine").* In it he clamored: "The most reliable happiness lies in the Golden Mean, therefore we should love it dearly." How high sounding. However, Kramskiy was never a "fanatic of the Golden Mean," but was every inch a down-to-earth aggressor. To him, the most important thing was to unify the theories of the Golden Mean and the theories of national betrayal: "To show kindness to visitors and emissaries from distant lands, and protect them." So this was what he drew out from the "Confucian Doctrine" to nakedly expose the real intent of the Russian worshippers of Confucius in "warmly cherishing the Golden Mean."

From Leonjev to Biyurin to Kramskiy, the study and utilization of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius by the Russian Church Mission intensified gradually with the development of the Tsarist Russian aggression against China. Eventually, the 12th group of the Church Mission produced a school of thought represented by Vashiliyev (瓦西里耶夫), raising even higher the black banner of Confucian worship and aggression against China. This was an official school that had a blood relationship with the Orthodox Church, enjoyed the favor of the Tsar, and developed fully in the new historical conditions under which the great powers began dividing China. Needless to say, Vashiliyev and his followers showed still clearer political inclinations. He linked Confucian worship and aggression against China with opposing the revolution, proclaimed all revolutions to be "calamities," and cursed the great T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo movement as "banditry." On the other hand, he praised the reactionary Confucianism represented by Confucius and Mencius as a "democratic and revolutionary doctrine."** It became so much clearer whom he loved and whom he hated. But it must be pointed out that Vashiliyev was himself a fanatic agitator of the "yellow peril"; "he puts before Russia an Asia mission, particularly a China mission. For the past decades, he has been talking about the role Russia should play as Asia' liberator. He sees an absolute necessity for the adoption of the European constitution in the Far East and the development of the economies of these countries. His strong imperialist idea made him an early advocate of a Siberian railway leading directly to the Pacific."*** It goes without saying that the reason behind Vashiliyev's endeavors to study the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius was that he wanted to link the dead soul of Confucius with the wild dreams of the Tsar, turning China into the "Yellow Russia" of the Romanov

---

* P.Y. Skachkov, Catalogue of China Studies, 1960 Russian edition, Moscow, p. 43.

** Gorbacheva, "The Russian Sinologist, Academician V.B. Vashiliyev," Series on the History of Russian Eastern Studies, Vol. II, 1956 Russian edition, Moscow, pp. 278, 288.

*** Haynes Gorvetser (海因茨·哥尔维策尔), The Yellow Peril: The History of a Slogan; A Study of Imperialist Thought, 1962 German edition, Gurtingen (格廷根), p. 102.

Dynasty. No wonder the Soviet revisionists have not forgotten him and looked upon him as a god even to this day. On the day marking the 150th birthday of Vashiliyev, commemorative activities were held on a grand scale. Reports and recollections were published.* The Soviet revisionists used the opportunity to conduct the "traditional education" on Confucian worship and aggression against China, in order to produce a group of modern "Vashiliyevs" and meet the reactionary political requirements of the Brezhnev doctrine.

It is very clear that the volumes of studies on Confucianism by the Russian Church Mission in Peking are certainly not, as the Soviet revisionists have claimed, "filled with respect for China's national culture." On the contrary, worship of Confucius was a means by which to commit aggression against China. Just as Lu Hsün said: "They are using, not respecting!" ("The Old Tune Has Been Sung")

In short, the history of the Russian Orthodox Church Mission was a record of crimes against the Chinese people. Since Peter I sent the first Church Mission to China, Tsars of successive generations had carried out this aggressive policy and taken all sorts of measures to strengthen the reactionary role of this instrument of aggression against China.

The large groups of "China hands" originating from the Russian Othodox Church Missions played vanguards for Tsarist Russia's aggression against China in the political, economic and cultural fields. Among them, some rattled sabers while others used their pens, and some made use of both. Under the veil of "friendship" and holding the banner of "worship for Confucius," they resorted to both hard and soft tactics, and committed unpardonable crimes against the Chinese people. They were nailed by history onto the pillar of shame, and no matter how hard the Soviet revisionist renegade clique prays for them, this flock of falcons and jackals that were let loose on China by the Romanov Dynasty will never be freed.

* * *

END

---

* "China's History and Culture -- Collection of Works in Memory of Academician Vashiliyev," 1974 Russian edition, Moscow.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Technical Information Service
Springfield, Va. 22161

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PRINTED MATTER

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
COM-211

U.S. MAIL

CMP X751231 001
UNIV ILLINOIS LIB AT CHICAGO CIRCLE
LIB SERIALS SEC
BOX 8198
CHICAGO IL 60680